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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Most Medicare spending for hospital care occurs under its Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) (MedPAC 2010).  Under this system 
Medicare pays each hospital a fixed-price for each Medicare patient within a 
given diagnosis-related group (DRG).  While the price for a given DRG can and 
does vary across hospitals, within a given hospital it is fixed for a year at a time.  
Medicare sets its price schedule prospectively for each hospital, so that at the 
start of a fiscal year, the hospital knows with certainty what Medicare will be 
paying during the upcoming year for each of the possible DRGs.  
The rising costs of Medicare continue to dominate discussions about how 
to reform the program so that spending is better-controlled.  The IPPS price 
schedule for hospitals is an important tool the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) has available to limit program spending.  It is not clear, 
however, whether reductions in revenue due to lower Medicare fees might lead 
some hospitals to sacrifice care quality as they seek to lower costs.  This is 
because there is little research on the nature of the relationship between what 
Medicare pays for a specific DRG and a hospital’s quality of care for patients in 
that DRG. 
At the same time, there is continued interest in improving the quality of 
care.  A recent review of the research literature on the quality of U.S. healthcare 
suggests that healthcare in many hospitals frequently does not meet professional 
2 
 
standards (Schuster et al. 2005).  The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines quality 
as “the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase 
the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current 
professional knowledge” (Lohr 1990).  Studies of the quality of acute care in the 
U.S. suggest that, on average, only about 70 percent of patients actually receive 
the recommended treatment.  The other 30 percent receive contra-indicated 
care (Schuster et al. 2005).  There is clearly room for improvement here. 
CMS and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have 
launched several initiatives in recent years aimed at improving care quality 
through provider accountability and through the public disclosure of information 
on the quality of care in hospitals.  One of these initiatives, undertaken in 
conjunction with the Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA), was the development and 
launching of a user-friendly on-line tool, called “Hospital Compare” 
(www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov), that provides consumers with information about 
patient care in their local area hospitals.  The Hospital Compare website allows 
consumers to compare the quality of care, patient satisfaction, and the outcomes 
of care across particular hospitals in their area.  Regarding quality, the website 
reports information on how often each hospital provides some of the 
recommended care to patients admitted for serious medical conditions, such as 
for a heart attack, heart failure, or pneumonia.  For each condition, Hospital 
Compare reports the percentage of patients who received various treatment 
protocols that are widely-agreed to be appropriate for patients admitted with that 
condition.  A hospital’s rate of adherence to a range of treatment protocols for 
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each medical condition determines its ranking vis-à-vis the other hospitals.  
Hospital Compare was debuted in April 2005 at 
www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov and at www.medicare.gov.  Nearly all U.S. 
hospitals (95 percent) voluntarily submit data from patients’ medical records for 
use in this quality reporting program (in part, because their Medicare PPS rates 
would be reduced if they chose not to participate).1
The database being assembled through Hospital Compare is unique.  For 
a large, nationwide sample of hospitals it contains both diagnosis-specific 
measures of care quality, along with diagnosis-specific Medicare payment rates.  
As such, it is well-suited for examining the nature of the relationship between 
Medicare payment and the quality of care provided to patients.  There is 
widespread interest in whether quality responds to payment, and if so, in what 
ways.   
  Over time CMS has added 
more measures that consumers can compare across hospitals.  In March 2008 
CMS added data on what Medicare pays each hospital for different types of 
Medicare admissions, and data on how many patients each hospital treats in 44 
high-prevalence DRGs. 
This dissertation explores the relationship between the Medicare payment 
rate and the quality of hospital care using the Hospital Compare data.  
Specifically, we examine the effects of Medicare’s hospital payment for 
                                            
1Section 501(b) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
stipulates that a hospital that does not submit performance data for Hospital Compare’s ten 
quality measures will receive a 0.4 percentage point reduction in its annual payment update from 
CMS for FY2005, 2006 and 2007.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 increased that reduction to 
2.0 percentage points.  Thus, there have been strong financial incentives for hospitals to 
participate in the program. 
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pneumonia, heart failure and heart attacks admissions on the quality of care 
provided to pneumonia, heart failure and heart attacks patients, respectively. 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, it 
develops a theoretical model of a hospital’s “quality” decision, which illustrates 
how quality responds to Medicare reimbursement.  Unlike previous models of 
hospital behavior, it distinguishes between hospital quality and hospital inputs.  
With this distinction, it derives the prediction that higher reimbursement leads to 
higher quality.  Second, using Hospital Compare data, it empirically estimates 
the payment/quality relationship for the case of pneumonia, heart failure, and 
heart attack individually.  To my knowledge, this is the first study to implement 
the Hospital Compare data for this purpose.  Finally, the analysis examines the 
effects of Medicare reimbursement on hospital- specific quality for patients with 
particular diagnoses, specifically, the diagnoses of pneumonia, heart failure, or 
heart attack.  
The dissertation is organized as follows.  The next chapter develops a 
simple model of hospital behavior under the assumption that a hospital 
maximizes an objective function that depends on both patient care and profit.  
The model then derives the testable hypothesis that quality is positively related to 
Medicare’s payment rate.  Chapter 3 briefly reviews the relevant prior literature 
on how the quality of care responds to Medicare payment rates.  Following this, 
Chapter 4 describes the methods and data used for the empirical analyses.  
Chapter 5 reports the key findings.  Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation 
with a qualitative summary of the broad findings that emerge from this work. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The theoretical analysis concerned models a hospital’s choice for quality 
of care, and derives whether and in what way, a hospital’s optimal choice relates 
to Medicare’s payment rate per admission.   Following Dranove (1988), 
Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) and Dafny (2003, 2005), it is assumed that a 
hospital maximizes an objective function that depends on both hospital profit, 𝜋, 
and patients’ health outcomes, 𝐻.  There is one payer for hospital care, 
Medicare, that pays a fixed reimbursement (𝑝) per admission, and all admissions 
are the same type, e.g., in the same DRG.  The following are the basic 
equations of the model:   
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐻,𝜋)                                                                                                                                    [1] 
𝐻 = 𝐻(𝐼,𝑄)                                                                                                                                     [2] 
𝜋 = 𝑅 − 𝑇𝐶                                                                                                                                      [3] 
𝑅 = 𝑝.𝑋                                                                                                                                             [4] 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑐.𝑋                                                                                                                                           [5] 
𝑐 = 𝑐(𝐼,𝑄)                    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝐼 = 𝑑𝑐𝑑𝐼 > 0, 𝑐𝑄 = 𝑑𝑐𝑑𝑄 > 0                                                      [6] 
𝑋 = 𝑋(𝑄)                     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑋 ′ = 𝑑𝑋
𝑑𝑄
> 0.                                                                               [7] 
Equation [1] is the hospital’s objective function, 𝑈(𝐻,𝜋), which depends on 
both the health outcomes of patients, 𝐻, and hospital profit, 𝜋.  The hospital 
produces health outcomes using its resources (i.e., inputs), 𝐼, and quality of 
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care, 𝑄, where increases in 𝑄 indicate a higher quality of care.  𝑄 is distinct 
from 𝐼 in this model, and can be thought of as measuring the hospital’s 
adherence to excellent standards of care.  Two hospitals with identical 
resources may have different quality levels, depending on how they use those 
resources.   
Profit, 𝜋, equals total revenue, 𝑅, minus total costs, 𝑇𝐶, and revenue 
depends on the number of admissions, 𝑋, times the price received per case, 
𝑝, from Medicare.  The hospital’s costs per patient, 𝑐, are an increasing function 
of its resources, 𝐼, and the quality of care provided, 𝑄.  As indicated in [7], the 
volume of admissions is assumed to depend on the hospital’s quality level, and 
higher quality attracts more patients.  It envisions a monopolistically competitive 
market in which hospitals compete for patients on the basis of quality.  Although 
physicians have no direct role here, one interpretation of Eq. [1] is that it reflects 
the objectives of the medical staff, who balance the hospital’s interest in profit 
with their patients’ interest in achieving the best health outcomes (Ellis and 
McGuire 1986).   
Substituting Eqs. [4] through [7] into [3], profit takes the following form, 
with partial derivatives for 𝐼 and 𝑄 given by: 
𝜋 = 𝑝.𝑋(𝑄) − 𝑐(𝐼,𝑄).𝑋(𝑄)   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝜋𝐼 = − 𝑐𝐼 .𝑋 < 0,𝜋𝑄 =   (𝑝 − 𝑐).𝑋 ′ − 𝑋. 𝑐𝑄      [8] 
In order to derive the necessary conditions for utility maximization, the 
model assumes (following Dranove 1988), Dafny (2003) and Weisbrod (2004)) 
that the hospital’s objective function can be approximated by a linear function 
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with non-negative weights, α and (1-α), on patient care and profit, respectively.  
In this case, making use of [8] the objective function is written as: 
𝑈 = 𝛼𝐻(𝐼,𝑄) + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑝.𝑋(𝑄) − 𝑐(𝐼,𝑄).𝑋(𝑄)]                                                                [9] 
Utility maximization with respect to resources and quality of care yields the 
following necessary first-order conditions for a solution:  
𝑈𝐼 = 𝛼𝐻𝐼 + (1 − 𝛼)(−𝑐𝐼).𝑋 = 0                                                                                             [10] 
𝑈𝑄 = 𝛼𝐻𝑄 + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑝.𝑋 ′ − �𝑐𝑄 .𝑋 + 𝑐.𝑋 ′�] = 0                                                               [11] 
For comparative static analysis, the model further assumes that the 
objective function is strictly concave and satisfies the sufficient second-order 
conditions, i.e., 𝑈𝐼𝐼 < 0,  𝑈𝑄𝑄 < 0, and |𝐻|2 = 𝑈𝐼𝐼 .𝑈𝑄𝑄 − (𝑈𝐼𝑄)2 > 0.   
Let 𝐼∗and 𝑄∗ denote the solution to eqs. [10] and [11], i.e., the hospital’s 
optimal levels for its resources and care quality.  Since 𝑝 enters eq. [11], 𝐼∗and 
𝑄∗ depend on 𝑝: 𝐼∗ = 𝐼∗(𝑝) and 𝑄∗ = 𝑄∗(𝑝).  A key result is the following:   
Proposition: Higher Medicare payment per admission should 
increase a hospital’s quality of care.  That is,  𝒅𝑸
∗
𝒅𝒑
> 0 .                                                                                                                                                          
Proof:  From the first order conditions and the implicit function theorem, a 
matrix equation is written as follows: 
�
𝑈𝐼𝐼 𝑈𝐼𝑄
𝑈𝑄𝐼 𝑈𝑄𝑄
�
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑑𝐼∗
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝑝 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤ = �−𝑈𝐼𝑝−𝑈𝑄𝑃�              𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 |𝐻| = |𝐽|3 = �𝑈𝐼𝐼 𝑈𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑄𝐼 𝑈𝑄𝑄� > 0                   [12] 
                                            
2 |𝐻| is Hessian determinant. 
3 |𝐽| is Jocobian determinant. 
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Using Cramer’s Rule, it follows that   
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝑝
= �𝑈𝐼𝐼 −𝑈𝐼𝑝𝑈𝑄𝐼 −𝑈𝑄𝑃�|𝐽| > 0   𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝐼𝐼 < 0,−𝑈𝑄𝑝 = (1 − 𝛼).𝑋 ′ < 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝐼𝑝 = 0       [13] 
Thus, this model predicts that a higher Medicare payment per admission 
will lead a utility-maximizing hospital to raise its quality of care, while a lower 
Medicare payment per admission will have the opposite effect.   
There is no similar result involving 𝐼∗ in this model, i.e., the effect of an 
increase in 𝑝 on the level of hospital resources, 𝐼∗, is ambiguous due to the 
tradeoff between hospital’s two objectives, hospital profit and patients’ health 
outcomes.  Before turning to an empirical test of the proposition above, the 
following chapter reviews a number of relevant previous studies of the effects of 
Medicare payments on hospital behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter briefly reviews prior theoretical work on the effects of 
Medicare payments on hospital behavior, and then summarizes the findings of 
empirical studies of the nature of the payment/quality relationship under 
Medicare.  It is not aware that any prior theoretical work on the payment/quality 
relationship in hospitals.  There has been work done, however, on the effects of 
third-party payments on a hospital’s choice of “intensity.”  Hodgkin and McGuire 
(1994) developed a model of how intensity per admission and the number of 
admissions respond to a third-party payment system, such as Medicare.  They 
loosely defined intensity to be either a hospital’s input level or its technical 
sophistication.  This is in keeping with ProPAC’s4
Their model had three key assumptions: (1) a hospital’s average cost per 
discharge varies only with its level of intensity, (2) consumer demand also varies 
only with intensity, and (3) the hospital maximizes utility, which depends on both 
intensity and profit.  Insurer reimbursement in their model takes the general 
 definition that intensity 
encompasses the number and complexity of patient care resources that are used 
in producing patient care (e.g., the size and composition of the nursing staff), or 
intermediate outputs in the hospital (such as the time patients spend in special 
care units, or the average length of stay).    
                                            
4 ProPAC is the abbreviation of Prospective Payment Advisory Committee, which is now 
currently called Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC). 
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form, 𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐, where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are nonnegative constants, and 𝑐 is the 
hospital’s average cost per discharge.  This function encompasses a number of 
payment approaches as special cases, including PPS (𝛼 > 0,𝛽 = 0), cost-based 
reimbursement (𝛼 = 0,𝛽 = 1), and mixed arrangements (𝛼 > 0,𝛽 > 0), such as 
those that Medicare used when phasing in PPS program between 1984 and 
1987.  Hodgkin and McGuire showed that a hospital’s utility-maximizing choice 
of intensity is positively related to 𝛼,  and positively related to 𝛽, ceteris paribus. 
Their model was extended by Dafney (2003) to allow for a mix of different 
DRGs among patients, where each DRG is paid a different rate.  She allowed 
each hospital to select an intensity level, denoted by Ihd, for each of its DRGs.  
Using comparative statics analysis Dafney showed that each chosen intensity 
level (Ihd) is positively relate to its corresponding DRG payment (Phd).   
In both the Hodgkin/McGuire model and in Dafney’s model the only choice 
a hospital makes is choosing intensity.  Intensity alone determines demand for 
admissions, and intensity alone determines cost per case.  There are no inputs 
and there is no quality, per se.  Rather, there is simply intensity. 
This model (in the preceding Chapter) views a hospital differently.  A 
hospital chooses both its inputs and a level for quality, and then combines them 
to produce patient health outcomes.  Both inputs and the level of quality 
determine a hospital’s cost per case.  Quality refers to whether its inputs are 
applied towards patient care in ways that produce better outcomes.  It is quality 
that matters to patients, not the level of inputs.  There is no intensity in the 
model, and inputs are distinct from quality.   
11 
 
Most prior empirical studies of the effects of Medicare payments on 
hospitals have examined either the effects of switching from cost-based 
reimbursement to PPS in the mid 1980s, or the effects of more incremental 
changes in payment rates that have occurred since then.  Studies of the 
transition to PPS investigated its effects on average length of stay, and the 
mortality rate of Medicare beneficiaries.  Freiman et al. (1989) and Cutler (1990)   
provide evidence that average length of stay decreased with the decrease of 
Medicare reimbursement.  However, the evidence regarding mortality is mixed.  
Rogers et al. (1990), Kahn et al. (1990), and Kosecoff et al. (1990) examined the 
effect of PPS on Medicare patients using a pre- and post- comparison.  The 
studies found no increase in patient mortality rates (in-hospital, 30-day, and 180-
day) subsequent to the switch to PPS, although there was an increase in the 
number of patients who were discharged in an unstable condition.  Cutler (1995) 
found that the introduction of PPS had no long-run effects on the mortality of the 
elderly treated for severe illnesses.  However, he found that decreases in 
average payments compressed the mortality distribution.  That is, there was an 
increase in in-hospital mortality, a decrease in post-discharge mortality, and no 
change in 1-year mortality.   
Studies by Staiger and Gaumer (1995), Shen (2003), Lindrooth et al 
(2007), and Kaestner and Guardado (2008) used plausibly exogenous variation 
in Medicare reimbursement that occurred under more recent program changes to 
examine the effects of changes in payment on treatment intensity, patient 
mortality, and the overall health outcomes of patients.  Staiger and Gaumer 
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(1995) examined the effect of payment changes on the mortality of Medicare 
patients treated for urgent care.  They found that changes in payment had 
mixed and unintuitive effects.  On one hand, they found a reduction in Medicare 
reimbursement significantly increased mortality at 45 days, but this phenomenon 
occurred mostly in government hospitals, and to a lesser extent, in for-profit 
hospitals.  On the other hand, in not-for-profit hospitals, reductions in Medicare 
reimbursement had no statistically significant effects on 1-year mortality.  
Shen (2003) examined the effect of payment changes on the mortality of 
Medicare patients treated for heart attack.  She found that a reduction in 
reimbursement for patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) increased their 
short-term mortality (measured at 7-, 30-, and 90-days), but left patients’ 1-year 
mortality unchanged.  
Lindrooth et al. (2007) studied how treatment intensity changed following 
changes in hospital reimbursement that occurred under the 1998 Balanced 
Budget Act (BBA), with special attention to how the responses varied between 
non-for-profit and for-profit hospitals.  They found that following the slowdown in 
the “update factor” used to calculate Medicare DRG rates, not-for-profit hospitals 
significantly reduced the treatment intensity of patients in more generously-paid 
DRGs, whereas for-profit hospitals made few changes in treatment intensity.  
Kaestner and Guardado (2008) also examined treatment intensity, and focused 
on how it responded to changes in Medicare rates that arose from the 
geographical reclassifications of hospitals.  They examined both hospital staffing 
and patient outcomes following reclassifications that occurred between 1994 and 
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2001.  They found that changes in Medicare payments of roughly 10 percent 
had no meaningful effect on either staffing levels or patient outcomes.                            
A number of studies have examined the effects of Medicare payments on 
the quality of patient care provided by physicians.  Generally speaking, studies 
find that physicians can and do respond to financial incentives by altering their 
treatment practices and the quality of care they provide to patients.  Yip (1998) 
examined how physicians responded to a Medicare fee reduction in coronary 
artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries, and found that physicians whose incomes 
were reduced the most by Medicare fee cuts performed higher volumes of 
CABGs.  Hadley et al. (2003) studied how Medicare breast surgery fees affect 
the treatment received by older women with localized breast cancer.  They 
found that Medicare’s payment differential between mastectomy and breast 
conserving surgery (BCS) with radiation therapy significantly influenced a 
physician’s choice between these two treatments.  In areas where Medicare 
paid more for BCS, physicians were more likely to perform BCS rather than 
mastectomy, ceteris paribus.  More recently, Brunt and Jensen (2010) found 
that over the period 2001-2003, lower Medicare reimbursement significantly 
reduced the perceived quality of physician visits for a wide range of quality 
measures, although the effects were small.   
There are no studies, to my knowledge, that examine the link between 
Medicare payments and the technical processes for care within hospitals.  Yet, 
this link is key to understanding the impact of a change in Medicare payment on 
health outcomes, since a hospital’s first response to a decrease in Medicare 
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payment may well entail altering its technical processes for care, which in turn 
influence patient outcomes.   
The present study examines the relationship between Medicare payments 
and a number of technical aspects of treating pneumonia, heart failure and heart 
attacks.  Specifically, the quality of pneumonia care, heart failure care and heart 
attacks care are measured by a hospital’s frequency of adherence to widely-
accepted treatment protocols for patients diagnosed with pneumonia, heart 
failure and heart attacks respectively.  This approach has two advantages.  
First, changes in how patients are treated likely reflect a hospital’s direct 
response to changes in reimbursement.  Second, models of adherence to 
treatment protocols may be less vulnerable to bias arising from omitted patient 
severity of illness than health outcomes measures, such as mortality rates or 
hospital readmission rates.   
  
15 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS  
Using data on U.S. hospitals it examines how Medicare payment rates for 
pneumonia, heart failure, and heart attacks affect the quality of pneumonia, heart 
failure, and heart attack care, respectively.  There are two objectives.  First, it is 
to determine for each of these diagnoses whether there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the Medicare payment and the quality of hospital 
care for patients with that diagnosis – pneumonia, heart failure or heart attack.  
Second, it is to obtain estimates of the marginal effect of a change in Medicare 
reimbursement on the quality of care for each of these conditions.  It assumes 
that within each hospital there is a common level of quality across all of the 
patients that share a particular primary diagnosis.  (That is, the quality of 
pneumonia care is assumed to be the same for all patients with pneumonia, the 
quality of heart failure care is assumed to be the same for all heart failure 
patients, and the quality of heart attack care is assumed to be the same for all 
heart attack patients.)   
Pneumonia is an inflammation of the lung commonly due to infection by 
bacteria, viruses, and sometimes by aspiration, fungi, or chemicals.  It is the fifth 
leading cause of death among adults ages 65 and over.  Among Medicare 
beneficiaries, pneumonia is the second most common cause of hospitalization 
(Myles Maxfield et al., 2004). 
Heart failure is the inability of the heart to pump sufficient blood to the 
body.  It is the most common cause of hospitalization among Medicare 
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beneficiaries.  Heart failure is also a chronic disease, for which appropriate 
outpatient management can reduce re-hospitalizations. Common risk factors for 
heart failure include previous heart attacks and high blood pressure.  (Angela 
Merrill et al.,2003). 
Heart attack is also called Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI).  It is a 
condition that occurs when the arteries leading to the heart become blocked and 
the blood supply is slowed or stopped.  Each year, approximately 1.1 million 
people experience an acute myocardial infarction (AMI), or heart attack.  One-
third of those suffering an AMI die during the acute phase. Over 80 percent of all 
heart attack–related deaths occur in individuals age 65 or older. The average age 
of first heart attack is 66 for men and 70 for women (Robert Schmitz et al., 2003). 
Heart failure, pneumonia, and heart attack rank among the ten most 
common diagnoses for Medicare inpatient care.  The processes of care 
represented by quality measures for these three conditions are known to improve 
the quality of care patients receive during inpatient visits to the hospital 
(CMS,2009). 
 
      4.1 Data 
Data for the analysis come from three sources.  Hospital-specific data on 
the quality of pneumonia care, heart failure care and heart attack care are from 
October, 2006 to September, 2007, and Medicare’s payment rate per pneumonia 
admission, per heart failure admission and per heart attack admission in that 
period come from the “Hospital Compare” website.  Data on other 
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characteristics of each hospital were obtained from the Prospective Payment 
System Impact (PPS Impact) files for Fiscal Year 2007 maintained by CMS, and 
data on each hospital’s local area characteristics were obtained from the 2008 
Area Resource file (ARF) of the Bureau of Health Professions.   
The hospital sample consists of acute care U.S. hospitals observed in 
fiscal year 2007 (from October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007) that meet the 
following criteria: (1) the hospital contracts with Medicare to provide acute 
inpatient care and agree to accept the program’s predetermined payment rates 
as payment in full.5
 
 (2) it participates in the Hospital Compare data disclosure 
program, (3) it reported data on all of Hospital Compare’s quality measures for 
pneumonia care, or heart failure care or heart attack care, and (4) Medicare 
payment data for the hospital were available at the Hospital Compare website.  
3,012 acute care hospitals met these criteria and comprise the sample for the 
empirical analysis for pneumonia care; 3,078 acute care hospitals met these 
criteria and comprise the sample for the empirical analysis for heart failure care; 
1,528 acute care hospitals met these criteria and comprise the sample for the 
empirical analysis for heart attack care.   
      4.2 Dependent Variables   
For hospitals that participate in its data disclosure program, Hospital 
Compare reports information on different quality measures of inpatient care: 
                                            
5 Medicare pays the approved amount minus any beneficiary liability, such as a deductible or 
copayment; the provider then collects the remaining amount from the beneficiary or a 
supplemental insurer (MedPAC 2010). 
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seven for pneumonia, four for heart failure and six for heart attacks.  The 
measures describe the percentage of patients at the hospital who actually 
received the recommended treatment protocols that are widely agreed to be 
appropriate and vital to patients admitted with pneumonia, heart failure or heart 
attacks.  Thus, they are quality measures consistent with the Institute of 
Medicine’s definition for quality (Lohr et al., 1990).   
 
      4.2.1 Process-of-Care Measures of Quality for Pneumonia Care 
In “Hospital Compare”, data describing the quality of pneumonia care are 
tabulated from a hospital’s actual medical records for its pneumonia patients.  
Specifically, the Hospital Compare database reports the percentage of 
pneumonia patients: (1) who were given an oxygenation assessment (this 
measure is called PN1), (2) who were given pneumococcal vaccination (PN2), 
(3) whose initial emergency room blood culture was performed prior to the 
administration of the first hospital dose of antibiotics (PN3), (4) who were given 
smoking cessation advice/counseling (PN4), (5) who were given initial antibiotics 
within 4 hours of arrival at the hospital (PN5), (6) who were given the most 
appropriate initial antibiotic(s) (PN6), and (7) who were assessed and given an 
influenza vaccination (PN7).6
A hospital’s score on all seven of these measures is used to create a 
scalar index of its overall quality rating for pneumonia care.  The index (PN) is 
  
                                            
6 For details on the instruction of index, see “Overview of Specifications of Measures Displayed 
on Hospital Compare as if December 14, 2006” available online: 
http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/18_HospitalProcessOfCareMeasures.asp#TopOfPage . 
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defined as the sum of a hospital’s scores across the seven item-specific 
measures described above.  Thus, the index ranges (in principle) from zero to 
700.  Our focus in the empirical work is estimating the relationship between 
Medicare’s payment rate for a pneumonia stay and this overall quality index. 
Table 1 reports statistics on the quality of pneumonia care across the 
3,012 hospitals in the sample.  The hospital’s overall quality rating for 
pneumonia care, PN, averages 619 across the hospitals.  The table reveals 
almost every pneumonia patient is given an oxygenation assessment (M=99.7), 
and the variation in this practice across hospitals is very slight.  The average 
score for PN3, PN5 and PN6, are all about 90, and the variation across hospitals 
is moderate, with a standard deviation ranging from 6.3% to 7.3%.  Average 
scores on the remaining three measures, PN2, PN4 and PN7, are varied and 
their variation across hospitals is substantial, with the standard deviation ranging 
from 14.2% to 19.7%.    
Table 1 
Variables: Hospital-Level Process of Care Quality Measures for Pneumonia (N=3012) 
 Variable Description Score (Percentage) Patient Sample 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
PN Overall quality index for 
pneumonia care (see text for 
definition) 
618.99 53.30 856.98 577.92 
PN1 % of pneumonia patients who 
were given oxygenation 
99.71 1.44 215.35 143.01 
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assessment 
PN2 % of pneumonia patients who 
were assessed and given 
pneumococcal vaccination 
79.58 17.27 165.07 116.63 
PN3 % of pneumonia patients 
whose initial emergency room 
blood culture was performed 
prior to the administration of 
their first hospital dose of 
antibiotics 
90.22 7.30 154.80 112.53 
PN4 % of pneumonia patients who 
were given smoking cessation 
advice /counseling 
90.12 14.18 64.52 50.74 
PN5 % of pneumonia patients who 
were given initial antibiotic(s) 
within 4 hours after arrival 
93.52 6.25 75.53 51.10 
PN6 % of pneumonia patients who 
were given the most 
appropriate initial antibiotic(s) 
88.43 7.34 118.52 78.03 
PN7 % of pneumonia patients who 
were assessed and given 
influenza vaccination 
77.41 19.65 63.18 46.29 
Notes: For the complete measure specifications see the Specifications Manual for 
National Hospital Quality Measures at www. qualitynet.org 
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      4.2.2 Process-of-Care Measures of Quality for Heart Failure Care 
Hospital Compare’s information on the quality of heart failure care are 
tabulated analogously.  That is, the data on care quality for heart failure care are 
computed from a hospital’s actual medical records for its heart failure patients.  
Specifically, the database reports the percentage of heart failure patients: (1) 
who were given discharge instructions (this measure is called HF1), (2) who were 
given an evaluation of left ventricular systolic function (HF2), (3) who were given 
ACE inhibitor or ARB for left ventricular systolic dysfunction (HF3), and (4) who 
were given smoking cessation advice /counseling (HF4). 7
      A hospital’s score on all four of these measures is used to create a scalar 
index of its overall quality rating for heart failure care.  The index (HF) is defined 
as the sum of a hospital’s scores across the four item-specific measures 
described above.  Thus, the index ranges (in principle) from zero to 400.  Our 
focus in the empirical work is estimating the relationship between the payment 
rate for a heart failure stay and this overall quality index. 
  
Table 2 reports statistics on the quality of heart failure care across the 
3,078 hospitals in the sample.  The hospital’s overall quality rating for heart 
failure care, HF, averages 343 across the hospitals.  The table reveals that the 
average score for HF2, HF3 and HF4, are above 85, but the variation across 
hospitals is large, with a standard deviation ranging from 11.8% to 15.6%.  
                                            
7 For details on the instruction of index, see “Overview of Specifications of Measures Displayed 
on Hospital Compare as if December 14, 2006” available online: 
http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/18_HospitalProcessOfCareMeasures.asp#TopOfPage . 
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Average scores on the measure HF1 is the lowest, 72.5, with a substantial 
variation (SD=21.1%) across hospitals. 
 
 
Table 2 
Variables: Hospital-Level Process of Care Quality Measures for Heart Failure (N=3078) 
Variable Description Score 
(Percentage) 
Patient Sample 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
HF Overall quality index for heart 
failure care (see text for definition) 
342.55 46.64 606.26 535.61 
HF1 % of heart failure patients who 
were given discharge instructions 
72.54 21.13 210.31 185.64 
HF2 % of heart failure patients who 
were given an evaluation of left 
ventricular systolic function 
91.50 11.84 259.32 220.53 
HF3 % of heart failure patients who 
were given ACE inhibitor or ARB 
for left ventricular systolic 
dysfunction  
86.73 11.85 91.76 92.17 
HF4 % of heart failure patients who 
were given smoking cessation 
advice /counseling 
91.59 15.64 44.87 46.18 
Notes: For the complete measure specifications see the Specifications Manual 
for National Hospital Quality Measures at www. qualitynet.org 
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      4.2.3 Process-of-Care Measures of Quality for Heart Attack Care 
In Hospital Compare the data on the quality of heart attack care are 
tabulated from a hospital’s actual medical records for its heart attack patients.  
Specifically, the database reports the percentage of heart attack patients: (1) who 
were given aspirin at arrival (this measure is called AMI1), (2) who were given 
aspirin at discharge (AMI2), (3) who were given ACE inhibitor or ARB for left 
ventricular systolic dysfunction (AMI3), (4) who were given smoking cessation 
advice /counseling (AMI4), (5) who were given beta blocker at discharge (AMI5), 
and (6) who were given beta blocker at arrival (AMI6). 8
Paralleling the approach to measuring overall quality for the other two 
diagnoses, a hospital’s scores on all six of these measures is used to create a 
scalar index of its overall quality rating for heart attack care.  The index (AMI) is 
defined as the sum of a hospital’s scores across the six item-specific measures 
described above.  Thus, the index ranges (in principle) from zero to 600.  Our 
focus in the empirical work is estimating the relationship between the payment 
rate for a heart attack stay and this overall quality index. 
  
Table 3 reports statistics on the quality of heart attack care across the 
1,528 hospitals in the sample.  The hospital’s overall quality rating for heart 
attack care, AMI, averages 566 across the hospitals.  The table reveals almost 
every heart attack patient is given aspirin at arrival (M=96.8), and the variation in 
this practice across hospitals is very slight.  The average score for AMI2, AMI5 
                                            
8 For details on the instruction of index, see “Overview of Specifications of Measures Displayed 
on Hospital Compare as if December 14, 2006” available online: 
http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/18_HospitalProcessOfCareMeasures.asp#TopOfPage . 
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and AMI6, are all about 90, and the variation across hospitals is moderate, with a 
standard deviation ranging from 6.0% to 6.3%.  The AMI4 scores 95.8 with a 
large variation (SD=11.36).  The lowest score is AM3 (M=86.7) with substantial 
variation (SD=12.9).    
Table 3 
Variables: Hospital-Level Process of Care Quality Measures for Heart Attack 
(N=1528) 
Variable Description Score 
(Percentage) 
Patient Sample 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
AMI Overall quality index for heart attack 
care (see text for definition) 
566.45 31.66 814.55 699.26 
AMI1 % of heart attack patients who were 
given aspirin at arrival 
96.77 3.54 156.07 112.71 
AMI2 % of heart attack patients who were 
given aspirin at discharge 
95.43 6.31 202.89 198.38 
AMI3 % of heart attack patients who were 
given ACE inhibitor or ARB for left 
ventricular systolic dysfunction  
86.68 12.86 45.99 46.41 
AMI4 % of heart attack patients who were 
given smoking cessation advice 
/counseling 
95.84 11.36 74.42 81.61 
AMI5 % of heart attack patients who were 
given beta blocker at discharge 
95.87 6.03 208.48 202.77 
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      4.3 Independent Variables  
      4.3.1 Medicare DRG Payment 
Medicare currently pays for acute inpatient services under the inpatient 
prospective payment system (IPPS).  Under this system, Medicare sets per-
discharge payment rates for Medicare severity diagnosis related groups (MS-
DRGs), which group patients with similar clinical problems that are expected to 
require similar amounts of hospital resources.  
      Hospitals in principle are “price-takers” for their Medicare admissions.  
Medicare pays each hospital a flat price per stay for each beneficiary admitted in 
the DRG, and that price remains constant year-long, and does not vary with a 
patient’s length of stay or the intensity of services provided to a patient.  Thus, 
within the same DRG a hospital receives the same amount for a short-stay, 
simple case and it does for a long-stay, complicated case.   
It measures Medicare’s payment rate for a pneumonia admission as the 
amount the hospital received from Medicare in 2007 for each admission in DRG 
89.  DRG 89 describes admissions with a primary diagnosis of “simple 
pneumonia with comorbidities or complications.”   DRG 89 is the fourth most 
commonly used DRG, representing 3.7 percent of all Medicare discharges 
(Office of Inspector General, 1989).  DRG 89 is the most frequently assigned 
AMI6 % of heart attack patients who were 
given beta blocker at arrival 
93.87 6.31 126.71    92.26 
Notes: For the complete measure specifications see the Specifications Manual 
for National Hospital Quality Measures at www. qualitynet.org 
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pneumonia-related DRG.  Medicare’s mean payment in 2007 for this DRG was 
$6,303 with a standard deviation of $1,341, revealing that Medicare’s payment 
rate varied considerably across U.S. hospitals. 
It measures Medicare’s payment rate for a heart failure admission as the 
amount the hospital received from Medicare in 2007 for each admission in DRG 
127.  DRG 127 describes admissions with a primary diagnosis of “heart failure.”  
In 2001, over one-half million beneficiaries were hospitalized at least once for 
heart failure, and Medicare spent over $4 billion on hospital care alone for heart 
failure (Angela Merrill et al., 2003).  Medicare’s mean payment in 2007 for this 
DRG was $6,381 with a standard deviation of $1,500, also revealing that 
Medicare’s payment rate varied considerably across U.S. hospitals. 
For heart attacks, Hospital Compare provides two DRG applying for heart 
attack admissions. One is DRG 121 describing admissions with a diagnosis of 
“heart attack with major complications”; the other one is DRG122 describing 
admissions with a diagnosis of “heart attack without complications”.  To 
measure the quality/payment for heart attack care appropriately, a price index is 
created to measure the payment rate for a heart attack admission by weighting 
the amount of the hospital received from Medicare in 2007 for each admission 
under DRG121 and each admission under DRG1229
                                            
9𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 =admissions under DRG121 total admissions under DRG121 and DRG122 ∗ payment rate for DRG121 +admissions under DRG121 total admissions under DRG121 and DRG122 ∗ payment rate for DRG122 
.  So the weighted mean 
payment in 2007 for heart attacks was $8,519 with a standard deviation of 
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$2,103, revealing that Medicare’s payment rate varied considerably across U.S. 
hospitals as well. 
 
      4.3.2 Other Independent Variables 
The price Medicare pays for a same DRG admission, however, does vary 
from hospital to hospital.  Medicare sets its price prospectively using a 
complicated formula that depends on a number of factors that can arguably be 
manipulated by a hospital, so in practice, there is some element of endogeneity 
in the price each receives.  Under its IPPS, Medicare’s price within a DRG is 
higher for: (1) hospitals in areas that face higher prices for medical care inputs, 
such as higher hourly wages for hospital employees, (2) hospitals that treat a 
disproportionate share (DSH) of very low-income patients, such as patients who 
rely on supplemental security income benefits or Medicaid patients, and (3) 
teaching hospitals that incur higher indirect costs of medical education (IME).  
They are also higher for admissions that are extraordinarily costly, called 
outliers .10
Specifically, Medicare’s payment rate formula adjusts for five aspects of 
input costs, two aspects of a hospital’s DSH-related expenses, and four aspects 
of its IME activities.  Medicare calls these hospital-specific variables “adjustment 
factors.”  Prior to the start of the 2007 fiscal year Medicare set its payment rate 
 
                                            
10 MedPAC Medicare Payment Basics: Hospital Acute Inpatient Services Payment System. 
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for the upcoming year in each of 57911
Medicare’s reliance on historical data partially alleviates an endogeneity 
concern with the measure of its 2007 payment rate for a pneumonia admission, a 
heart failure admission or a heart attack admission.  However, it does not 
eliminate the concern entirely.  In particular, if some of those hospital 
characteristics, i.e., the adjustment factors, also affect care quality, but are 
omitted from an estimated quality regression, then their effects are arguably 
picked up by the regression’s disturbance term.  In this case the payment rate 
could be correlated with the disturbance, implying endogeneity, because those 
same adjustment factors are the known determinants of a hospital’s rate.  
Following Hadley et al. (2003), to reduce the possibility of correlation between 
the payment rate and the disturbance, the regression models also control 
explicitly for the adjustment factors. 
 severity-adjusted DRGs.  Medicare 
draws its data for each hospital’s adjustment factors from previous years, not the 
current year.  So it is always a hospital’s past choices (for those adjustment 
factors) that can influence its upcoming payment rates, not its current choices.   
The identification assumption underlying estimation of the effects of 
payment is that by controlling for Medicare’s adjustment factors directly in the 
quality model, the disturbance those hospital characteristics that are correlated 
with payment has been removed.  With this strategy, there is likely be some 
correlation among explanatory variables in the model, but it should not be a 
problem provided it is not too large.  This issue will be examined empirically.   
                                            
11 Now Medicare uses 745 DRGs. 
29 
 
Data on the adjustment factors used by Medicare are available from the 
CMS IPPS Impact File for 2007.  There are 11 variables in this category, 
including the wage index applicable to the hospital’s location (WI), the cost of 
living adjustment for operating PPS (COLA), the geographic adjustment factor for 
capital PPS (GAF), the ratio of Medicare operation costs to Medicare covered 
charge (OPPCR), the ratio of Medicare capital costs to Medicare covered 
charges (CPCCR), the resident-to-bed ratio used to calculate the IME adjustment 
to operating cost (RESBED), the ratio of residents-to-average-daily-census used 
to calculate the IME adjustment to capital cost (RDAY), the IME adjustment to 
operating costs (TCHOP), the IME adjustment to capital costs (TCHCP), the 
operating cost disproportionate share adjustment (DSHOPG), and the capital 
cost disproportionate share adjustment (DSHCPG). 
Other hospital characteristics may also influence quality.  The facility’s 
ownership status, for example, may affect the relative importance it places on 
quality and profit (Sloan et al. 2001), or in terms of the model, its value for 𝛼 in 
equation [10] above.  The model therefore controls for whether a hospital is 
government-owned (OWNERG), non-profit (OWNERV), or for- profit (OWNERP).  
Because there are geographic variations in health care delivery that may involve 
quality (Wennberg, 1999,2002), the model also controls for a hospital’s region 
(whether New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, East North Central, East 
South Central, West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, or the Pacific 
region), and whether a hospital is in an urban area (URBAN).  It controls for a 
hospital’s size using a series of dummy variables for its bed count (50 or fewer, 
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51-100, 101-150, 151-200, 201-300, or more than 300 beds) as well.  Whether 
the hospital is a teaching facility (TEACH), its patient case-mix, as measured by 
the Medicare case-mix index (CMI), its average daily census (ADC), the total 
number of Medicare discharges at the hospital (BILLS), Medicare patients’ share 
of total inpatient days (MCRPCT), and the percent of admissions meeting 
Medicare’s disproportionate share criteria (DSHPCT) are also in each of the 
models. 
Finally, the models control for a number of market-level characteristics, to 
gain insight into whether the structure of the market also affects the quality of 
hospital care.  A measure of the concentration of hospitals is included in the 
facility’s local area, specifically, a hospital Herfindahl index (HHI) measured at 
the county-level.  The index is the sum of the squared market shares of all 
short-term general hospitals in the county.  It takes positive values, with higher 
values signifying a greater concentration of hospitals, and it has a maximum 
value of 1 for any hospital that is the only short-term general hospital in its 
county.  The absolute number of short-term general hospitals in the county 
(NHOS), and population density, as measured by individuals per square mile 
(POPSQ), are also included to capture additional aspects of the market.  The 
data used to construct these variables are from the Area Resource File.  Table 
4, Table 5 and Table 6 report summary statistics on all of the independent 
variables in the quality models for pneumonia, heart failure and heart attack 
respectively.  
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      4.4 Model Specification 
The objective is to estimate the marginal effect of an increase in the 
Medicare payment rate on the quality of hospital care for pneumonia, heart 
failure, and heart attacks.  Multivariate regression is used for this purpose, 
allowing for a possibly nonlinear relationship between payment and quality.  
Three separate sets of models is estimated.  One set describes the 
determinants of the quality in pneumonia care, another set describes the quality 
of heart failure care, and a third set describes the quality of heart attack care.   
The basic model within each diagnosis category takes the following form: 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖)2 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  [14]  
Here 𝑖 indexes a hospital, 𝑄 is the quality measure for that diagnosis, 
𝑃𝑎𝑦 is Medicare’s average payment to hospital 𝑖 for that diagnosis, 𝑃𝑎𝑦 ∗
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠, an interaction term, is the hospital’s total revenue from Medicare payment 
and also controls for possible economies of scale in the provision of quality, (𝑃𝑎𝑦)2 is payment rate squared, 𝐴𝐹 is the vector of hospital-specific adjustment 
factors used by Medicare to determine the hospital’s rate, 𝐻 is the vector of 
hospital characteristics described above, 𝑀 is the vector of market area 
characteristics, and 𝑢𝑖  is a randomly distributed disturbance term with mean 
zero.   
Given equation [14] the marginal effect of Medicare reimbursement on the 
diagnosis-specific quality of hospital care is: 
𝑑𝑄𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 2𝛽3𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖                                        [15] 
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Thus, the marginal effect depends on the volume of patient cases and the 
Medicare payment rate.  Equation [15] also illustrates how Medicare updates its 
annual base payment rates (known as standardized payment amounts).  
Medicare’s payments are derived through a series of factor adjustments applied 
to these base payment rates.  The base payment rates are updated annually, 
and absent other policy changes, the update raises all payment rates 
proportionately12
 
, affecting all fees across all hospitals paid under IPPS by 
exactly the same percentage.  The update on the annual base payment rate is 
currently Medicare’s primary policy tool for controlling spending for inpatient care.  
      4.5 Model Estimation 
In the econometric analyses, the focus is on correcting for potential 
heteroskedasticity in the disturbances, and on checking whether there is still 
endogeneity in the Medicare payment rate after adjusting for hospital and 
geographic characteristics.  Equation [14] is estimated first by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with nonrobust standard errors (referred to as model 1) for 
pneumonia, heart failure and heart attacks.  Then the possibility of 
heteroskedastcity for each of them is tested, using a Breusch-Pagan test 
(Breusch and Pagan 1979).  The tests for each of them, pneumonia, heart 
failure and heart attacks, firmly reject an assumption of homoskedasticity (p 
<0.001).   
                                            
12 MedPAC Medicare Payment Basics: Hospital Acute Inpatient Services Payment System. 
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Three different methods are used to correct for heteroskedasticity, and are 
referred as model 2, model 3, and model 4, respectively.  In model 2, we 
calculate and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the OLS 
estimator.  This approach is valid in large samples whether or not the errors 
have constant variance (White 1980).  However, due to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, an OLS estimator is no longer the best linear unbiased 
estimator.  Therefore, equation [14] is also estimated using a Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator (Wooldridge 2009), assuming the 
variance of the error is a function of the independent variables.  Even though an 
FGLS estimator is no longer unbiased, it is consistent and asympototically more 
efficient than OLS.  Model 3 is the FGLS estimator, without robust standard 
errors, assuming the variance of the error is a linear function of the independent 
variables.  Finally, Model 4 reports an FGLS estimator with robust standard 
errors, assuming the variance of the error term is a nonlinear function of the 
independent variables.    
A Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is used to assess whether the 
estimated coefficients differ across these models for pneumonia, heart failure 
and heart attacks separately (Wooldridge, 2009, pp.286).  In Hausman tests for 
all pneumonia, hear failure and heart attacks models, it fails to find significant 
differences between model 1 and model 3 (p > 0.85).  It also test for whether 
model 2 and model 4 have different estimated coefficients, using the 
heteroskedasticity-robust version of a Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 118-
123).  In all these tests for pneumonia, heart failure and heart attack models, 
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they still cannot reject the hypothesis of “no difference” between model 2 and 
model 4 (p > 0.73).  The results of these Hausman tests suggest that the 
endogeneity is unobserved and the results of model 4 are likely highly reliable in 
each of the quality of care model, pneumonia, heart attack and heart failure.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
      5.1 Results for Pneumonia Care 
Table 7 reports the correlation coefficients for all seven quality measures 
for pneumonia care.  As Table shows, the seven quality measures for 
pneumonia care are all positively correlated with one another.  The correlation 
between PN2 and PN7 is particular strong, with a correlation coefficient of 0.79.  
All pair-wise correlations of the quality measures are statistically significant at the 
1% level.   
Table 8 reports the estimated models for the determinants of the quality of 
pneumonia care.  The dependent variable is the index measure of hospital 
quality, PN.   The first two columns display OLS regression parameters with 
and without robust standard errors, and the third and fourth column display FGLS 
regression parameters with and without robust standard errors.  Because the 
FGLS estimates with robust standard errors are the most efficient estimates, 
given the presence of heteroskedasticity, the focus will be on the result of Model 
4.    
The interest centers on determining whether the Medicare reimbursement 
rate is positively related to quality.  As Table 8 reveals, the relationship between 
payment and quality is nonlinear, with statistically significant first and second 
order terms.  The first order term has a large, negative effect on quality, while 
the second order term and payment squared term have a small, positive effect on 
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quality.  This means that the marginal effect of payment on quality depends on 
the level of payment.  It is negative over one range of payments, and positive 
over another range of payments.      
Table 9 reports how the marginal effect of the payment rate varies over 
the full range of rates and pneumonia caseloads in this sample.  It reports the 
marginal effect as a function of payment, when pneumonia caseload is held at 
the 1st-, 5th-, 10th-, 25th-, 50th-, 75th-, 90th-, 95th-, and 99th-percentile, respectively.  
It also reports the marginal effect of payment as a function of caseload, when 
payment is held at the 1st-, 5th-, 10th-, 25th-, 50th-, 75th-, 90th-, 95th-, and 99th- 
percentile, respectively.  The standard error for each marginal effect in this table 
was calculated using the methods suggested by Wooldridge (2009, pp 198-199).  
Each entry in Table 9 reports the change in the quality index resulting from a 
$100 increase in payment, when payment and caseload are at the levels given in 
that row and column, respectively. For example, the number -0.287, which 
appears in the first row and column indicates that when payment is at $ 4,752 
and the pneumonia caseload is at 17 cases per year, a $100 change in payment 
would lead to a decrease of 0.287 in the hospital’s quality index.  However, this 
change is statistically insignificant in view of the calculated standard error for this 
marginal effect.  
As shown in Table 9, over much of the range for payment and caseload, 
the marginal effect of a $100 change in payment on quality is insignificant.  
However, for the most highly paid hospitals, and for hospitals with very high 
pneumonia caseloads, the marginal effect of a $100 change in payment on 
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quality is positive and significant.  This may be because with highly-paid and 
heavily case-loaded hospitals, the revenue from pneumonia DRG 89 occupies a 
relatively larger share of hospital total revenue and hospital profit.  This would 
give these hospitals a greater incentive to improve the quality of their pneumonia 
care. 
These findings suggest that unless a hospital is already highly paid for 
pneumonia cases, or treating a relatively high number of such cases, paying 
more for pneumonia cases is unlikely to improve the quality of pneumonia care.  
Alternatively, paying less for pneumonia cases has little impact on the quality of 
care.   
There were a total of 433,531 cases under DRG 89 in 2007 for pneumonia 
care in the 3012 acute care hospitals in this sample.  Based on these results, if 
Medicare paid $100 less per pneumonia case, only 58 hospitals (1.9 percent of 
the 3,012 hospitals in the sample) would experience a significant decrease in 
care quality, and in the affected hospitals, the overall quality index would decline 
by approximately 0.256 percent to 0.594 percent, which are both well under one 
percent.  This means that care quality would not suffer much.  Such a price 
reduction could save Medicare approximately 43 million dollars (1.6 percent of 
total Medicare spending in DRG 89 in 3012 acute hospitals) just for pneumonia 
care in DRG 89.  Except for the 58 hospitals with significant effects on the 
reduction of Medicare payment, 2194 hospitals report insignificant negative 
effects and 760 hospitals report insignificant positive effects. 
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Table 10 reports the overall marginal effects of the payment rate on PN1 
through PN7, respectively, calculated at the sample mean (payment= 6,300 and 
pneumonia cases=145). The table reveals that none of these seven individual 
processes are significantly related to the payment rate (p > .10), when calculated 
at the sample mean.  The marginal effects of PN1, PN3 and PN4 are positive at 
the mean, in both the OLS and FGLS equations.  The marginal effects of PN2, 
PN6 and PN7, however, are negative in both the OLS and FGLS equations.  
PN5 shows a mixed effect, which is positive in the OLS equations, but negative 
in the FGLS equations. 
Turning to some of the other findings, a hospital’s ownership status and 
location are also important determinants of its performance.  Relative to 
government-owned hospitals (the reference group), non-profit and for-profit 
hospitals both provide significantly higher levels of quality for pneumonia 
patients.   
Significant regional effects are also evident from the models estimated.  
Relative to the Pacific region (which encompasses CA, OR, WA, HI, and AK), 
hospitals in other areas exhibit higher quality care for pneumonia patients.  The 
highest quality care occurs in hospitals in New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, 
and VT) and the West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, and SD) region.  
Hospitals in the Mountain region (AI, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, and WY) perform 
slightly better than those in the Pacific region. 
Interestingly, there is little effect of a hospital’s size on its level of quality.  
Relative to hospitals with 50 or fewer beds, hospitals with 51-100 beds provide 
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significantly higher quality.  Larger hospitals, however, have comparable quality 
to relatively small hospitals.    
 
      5.2 Results for Heart Failure Care 
The four quality measures for heart failure care are all positively correlated 
with one another.  The correlation between HF1 and HF4 is strong, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.54.  All pair-wise correlations of the quality measures 
are statistically significant at the 1% level.   
Table 10 reports the estimated models for the determinants of the quality 
of heart failure care.  The dependent variable is the index measure of hospital 
quality, HF.  The first two columns display OLS regression parameters with and 
without robust standard errors, and the third and fourth column display FGLS 
regression parameters with and without robust standard errors.  Because the 
FGLS estimates with robust standard errors are the most efficient estimates, 
given the presence of heteroskedasticity, the focus is on the result of Model 4.    
Our interest centers on determining whether the Medicare reimbursement 
rate is positively related to quality.  As Table 10 reveals, the relationship 
between payment and quality is nonlinear, with statistically significant first and 
second order terms.  The first order term has a large, negative effect on quality, 
while the second order term and payment squared term have a small, positive 
effect on quality.  This means that the marginal effect of payment on quality 
depends on the level of payment.  It will be negative over one range of 
payments, and positive over another range of payments.      
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Table 11 reports how the marginal effect of the payment rate varies over 
the full range of rates and heart failure caseloads in this sample.  It reports the 
marginal effect as a function of payment, when heart failure caseload is held at 
the 1st-, 5th-, 10th-, 25th-, 50th-, 75th-, 90th-, 95th-, and 99th-percentile, respectively.  
It also reports the marginal effect of payment as a function of caseload, when 
payment is held at the 1st-, 5th-, 10th-, 25th-, 50th-, 75th-, 90th-, 95th-, and 99th- 
percentile, respectively.  The standard error for each marginal effect in this table 
was calculated using the methods suggested by Wooldridge (2009, pp 198-199).  
Each entry in Table 11 reports the change in the quality index resulting from a 
$100 increase in payment, when payment and caseload are at the levels given in 
that row and column, respectively. For example, the number -0.130, which 
appears in the first row and column indicates that when payment is at $ 4,750 
and the heart failure caseload is at 17 cases per year, a $100 change in payment 
would lead to a decrease of 0.130 in the hospital’s quality index.  However, this 
change is statistically insignificant in view of the calculated standard error for this 
marginal effect.  
As shown in Table 11, over much of the range for payment and caseload, 
the marginal effect of a $100 change in payment on quality is insignificant.  
However, for the most highly paid hospitals, and for hospitals with very high heart 
failure caseloads, the marginal effect of a $100 change in payment on quality is 
positive and significant.  This may be because with highly-paid and heavily 
case-loaded hospitals, the revenue from heart failure DRG 127 occupies a 
relatively larger share of hospital total revenue and hospital profit.  This would 
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give these hospitals a greater incentive to improve the quality of their heart failure 
care 
These findings suggest that unless a hospital is already highly paid for 
heart failure cases, or treating a relatively high number of such cases, paying 
more for heart failure cases is unlikely to improve the quality of heart failure care.  
In other words, paying less for heart failure cases has little impact on the quality 
of care.   
There were a total of 579,876 cases under DRG 127 in 2007 for heart 
failure care in the 3,078 acute care hospitals in this sample.  Based on these 
results, if Medicare paid $100 less per heart failure case, only 134 hospitals (4.4 
percent of the 3,078 hospitals in the sample) would experience a significant 
decrease in care quality, and in the affected hospitals, the overall quality index 
would decline by approximately 0.238 percent to 1.134 percent, which are both 
well under 1.5 percent.  This means that care quality would not suffer much.  
Such a price reduction could save Medicare approximately 58 million dollars (1.5 
percent of total Medicare spending in DRG 127 in 3078 acute hospitals) just for 
heart failure care in DRG 127.  Except for the 134 hospitals with significant 
effects on the reduction of Medicare payment, 1215 hospitals report insignificant 
negative effects and 1729 hospitals report insignificant positive effects. 
Table 12 reports the overall marginal effects of the payment rate on HF1 
through HF4, respectively, calculated at the sample mean (payment= 6,381 and 
heart failure cases=188). The table reveals that most of these four individual 
processes are insignificantly related to the payment rate (p > .10), when 
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calculated at the sample mean.  The marginal effects of HF1and HF3 are 
positive at the mean, in both the OLS and FGLS equations.  The marginal 
effects of HF4, however, are negative in both the OLS and FGLS equations.  
HF2 shows a mixed effect, which is positive in the OLS equations, but negative in 
the FGLS equations. 
Turning to some of the other findings, a hospital’s ownership status and 
location are also important determinants of its performance.  Relative to 
government-owned hospitals (the reference group), non-profit and for-profit 
hospitals both provide significantly higher levels of quality for heart failure 
patients.   
Significant regional effects are also evident from the models estimated.  
Relative to the Pacific region (which encompasses CA, OR, WA, HI, and AK), 
hospitals in other areas except for Mountain region all exhibit significantly much 
higher quality care for heart failure patients.  The highest quality care occurs in 
hospitals in East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, and WI) and South Atlantic (DE, 
DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA and WV).  Hospitals in the Mountain region (AI, 
CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, and WY) perform slightly worse than those in the 
Pacific region but it is statistically insignificant. 
There are significant effects of a hospital’s size on its level of quality.  
Relative to hospitals with 50 or fewer beds, all other hospitals with more than 50 
beds all provide significantly much higher quality than those with 50 or fewer 
beds.  The highest quality care for heart failure patients occurs in hospitals with 
201 - 300 beds and hospitals with more than 300 beds.  
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      5.3 Results for Heart Attack Care 
The six quality measures for heart attack care are all positively correlated 
with one another.  The correlation between AMI2 and AMI5 is particular strong, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.68.  All pair-wise correlations of the quality 
measures are statistically significant at the 1% level.   
Table 13 reports the estimated models for the determinants of the quality 
of heart attack care.  The dependent variable is the index measure of hospital 
quality, AMI.  The first two columns display OLS regression parameters with and 
without robust standard errors, and the third and fourth column display FGLS 
regression parameters with and without robust standard errors.  Because the 
FGLS estimates with robust standard errors are the most efficient estimates, 
given the presence of heteroskedasticity, the focus on the result of Model 4.    
Our interest centers on determining whether the Medicare reimbursement 
rate is positively related to quality.  As Table 13 reveals, the relationship 
between payment and quality is nonlinear, with statistically significant second 
order term.  The first order term has a negative and insignificant effect on 
quality, while the second order term and payment squared term, has a small, 
positive effect on quality.  This means that the marginal effect of payment on 
quality depends on the level of payment.  It will be negative over one range of 
payments, and positive over another range of payments.      
Table 14 reports how the marginal effect of the payment rate varies over 
the full range of rates and heart attack caseloads in this sample.  It reports the 
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marginal effect as a function of payment, when heart attack caseload is held at 
the 1st-, 5th-, 10th-, 25th-, 50th-, 75th-, 90th-, 95th-, and 99th-percentile, respectively.  
It also reports the marginal effect of payment as a function of caseload, when 
payment is held at the 1st-, 5th-, 10th-, 25th-, 50th-, 75th-, 90th-, 95th-, and 99th- 
percentile, respectively.  The standard error for each marginal effect in this table 
was calculated using the methods suggested by Wooldridge (2009, pp 198-199).  
Each entry in Table 14 reports the change in the quality index resulting from a 
$100 increase in payment, when payment and caseload are at the levels given in 
that row and column, respectively. For example, the number 0.028, which 
appears in the first row and column, indicates that when payment is at $ 5,372 
and the heart attacks caseload is at 27 cases per year, a $100 change in 
payment would lead to a increase of 0.028 in the hospital’s quality index.  
However, this change is statistically insignificant in view of the calculated 
standard error for this marginal effect.  
As shown in Table 14, over all of the range for payment and caseload, the 
marginal effect of a $100 change in payment on quality is insignificant.  These 
findings suggest that paying more for heart attack cases is unlikely to improve 
the quality of heart attack care.  In other words, paying less for heart care cases 
has little impact on the quality of care.   
There were a total of 134,158 cases under heart attack DRG 121 and 
DRG122 in 2007 for heart attack care in the 1528 acute care hospitals in this 
sample.  Based on these results, if Medicare paid $100 less per heart attack 
case, care quality would not suffer much.  Such a price reduction could save 
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Medicare approximately 13 million dollars (1.1 percent of total Medicare spending 
in DRG121 and DRG122 in 1028 acute hospitals) just for heart attack care in 
DRG 121 and DRG122. 
Table 15 reports the overall marginal effects of the payment rate on AMI1 
through AMI6, respectively, calculated at the sample mean (payment= 8,519 and 
heart attack cases=88). The table reveals that none of these six individual 
processes are significantly related to the payment rate (p > .10), when calculated 
at the sample mean.  The marginal effects of AMI1 through AMI6 are all positive 
at the mean, in both the OLS and FGLS equations.   
Turning to some of the other findings in the quality of heart attack care, 
compare to pneumonia and heart failure, a hospital’s ownership status and 
location are not important determinants of its performance in heart attack care.  
Relative to government-owned hospitals (the reference group), non-profit 
hospitals provide higher level of quality for heart attack patients, but for-profit 
hospitals provide lower levels of quality for heart attack patients.  However, both 
results are insignificant. 
Significant regional effects are some evident from the models estimated.  
Relative to the Pacific region (which encompasses CA, OR, WA, HI, and AK), all 
hospitals in other areas exhibit higher quality care for heart attack patients.  But 
only three regions, the New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, and VT), the East 
North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH and WI) and the West North Central (IA, KS, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, and SD) present statistically significant higher quality of care.  
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There is significant effect of a hospital’s size on its level of quality.  
Relative to hospitals with 50 or fewer beds, except for hospitals with 51-100 
beds, hospitals with more than 100 beds all provide significantly higher quality of 
heart attack care.   
Overall, the results from heart attacks care do not show the significant 
impact of Medicare payment on the quality of heart attack care.  This is distinct 
from the results from pneumonia and heart failure, which both show significant 
impact of Medicare payment on the care quality on high paid or high case-loaded 
hospitals.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has examined the effects of Medicare reimbursement on the 
quality of hospital care, both theoretically and empirically.  A model of quality 
determination in hospitals was developed, and used to derive the testable 
hypothesis the Medicare reimbursement rate and hospital quality should be 
positively related.  Thus, it is expected that an increase in Medicare’s payment 
for a given DRG should have a positive impact on a hospital’s quality of care for 
that DRG.  Newly available data on the quality of hospital care and Medicare 
payments for pneumonia, heart failure and heart attacks were then used to 
empirically test this hypothesis, controlling for hospital and market area 
characteristics, as well as for the adjustment factors used by Medicare in setting 
its hospital rates.   
The study finds the relationship between Medicare payment and the 
quality of hospital care is qualitatively similar for pneumonia and heart failure 
care.  In both cases the econometric model finds a significant nonlinear 
relationship between payment and quality.  The first order term has a large, 
negative effect on quality, while the second order term and payment squared 
term have small, positive effects on quality. However, for heart attack care this 
nonlinear relationship is found to be insignificant.  
For pneumonia care and heart failure care, the marginal effect of payment 
was found to depend on both the level of payment and the hospital’s caseload for 
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that DRG.  Upon calculating the marginal effect of payment for different types of 
hospitals two findings emerged.  On one hand, for the average hospital in the 
sample, the marginal effect on paying $100 dollar more on the quality of care is 
insignificant.  On the other hand, for hospitals that are very highly paid for 
pneumonia patients or heart failure patients, or that treat large numbers of 
pneumonia cases or heart failure cases, there is a positive and significant 
marginal effect of payment on care quality.  This finding is interpreted as partial 
support for the key hypothesis.   
For hospitals in these categories, which likely derive substantial revenue 
from pneumonia care or heart failure care, an increase in Medicare payment for 
pneumonia care or heart failure care leads to a small and significant 
improvement in the quality of pneumonia care or heart failure care they provide.  
However, even for these hospitals, the size of the effects observed is 
quantitatively very small.  (On the study heart attack care, the marginal effect on 
paying $100 dollar more on the quality of care is insignificant for all hospitals with 
very small scale as well.)    
These findings suggest that under the current, resource-based purchasing 
model, it would likely be very hard to significantly improve hospital quality simply 
by paying hospitals a little more or a little less.  To use financial incentives to 
encourage hospitals to improve quality of care, a value-based purchasing model 
should be designed.   
These findings are good news for Medicare.  If true for other DRGs, not 
just for pneumonia under DRG 89, heart failure under DRG 127 and heart attack 
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under DRG 121 and DRG122, it suggests that if Medicare were to reduce 
payment rates to hospitals by one-to-two percent, there would likely be few 
negative repercussions on care quality.   
Further research is needed to draw the whole picture of the 
payment/quality relationship.  In the theoretical model, the hospital quality 
choice model should be extended to hospitals receiving different types of 
patients, (i.e different types of DRG) in the monopolistically competitive market. 
In the empirical study, other measures of quality should be applied to this study.  
Although quality indicators are widely accepted, they cannot fully contain the 
multi-dimensional nature of hospital quality.  Moreover, these quality indicators 
focus on the technical aspects of care but do not capture the quality of life in the 
hospital, an important dimension of care quality.  Third, panel approaches 
should be conducted to improve this study when the data are available because 
other factors, unobserved by the cross-sectional analysis, might affect the 
payment/quality relationship.  In this study, geographic factors could impact both 
Medicare reimbursement and care quality. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 4   
Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables for Pneumonia Care (N=3012) 
Variable  Description Mean  SD 
Payment a    
Pay Medicare average payment (measured in 
thousands) for pneumonia DRG 89 
6.30 1.34 
Cases Number of cases for pneumonia DRG 89 143.87 99.70 
Pay*Cases Total payment for pneumonia DRG 89 907.75 676.57 
Hospital 
Characteristics 
   
Ownership    
OWNERG 1=Government; 0=others 0.19 0.39 
OWNERV 1=Voluntary non-profit; 0=others 0.65 0.48 
OWNERP 1=Profit; 0=others 0.17 0.37 
Region    
New England 1=NEW ENGLAND;0=others 0.04 0.21 
Middle 
Atlantic 
1=MIDDLE ATLANTIC; 0=others 0.12 0.33 
South Atlantic 1=SOUTH ATLANTIC; 0=others 0.18 0.39 
East North 
Central 
1=EAST NORTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.15 0.36 
East South 
Central 
1=EAST SOUTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.10 0.30 
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West North 
Central 
1=WEST NORTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.07 0.27 
West South 
Central 
1=WEST SOUTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.14 0.35 
Mountain 1=MOUNTAIN; 0=others 0.06 0.24 
Pacific 1=PACIFIC; 0=others 0.11 0.32 
BED    
Bed50                   1 if beds<= 50; 0=others 0.13 0.34 
Bed51_100 1 if 50<beds<=100; 0=others 0.19 0.40 
Bed101_150 1 if 100<beds<=150; 0=others 0.19 0.40 
Bed151_200 1 if 150<beds<=200; 0=others 0.12 0.33 
Bed201_300 1 if 200<beds<=300; 0=others 0.16 0.37 
Bed301 1 if beds>300; 0=others 0.19 0.39 
URBAN 1 if geographic location is at the Urban, 
0=rural 
0.70 0.46 
TEACH 1 if teaching hospital, 0=non-teaching 
hospital 
0.33 0.47 
CMI Case mixed index 1.36 0.25 
ADC Average daily census 122.97 129.70 
BILLS Medicare cases measured in thousands  3.72 3.3 
MCRPCT Medicare days as a percent of total inpatient 
days 
0.51 0.14 
DSHPCT Disproportionate share percent 0.27 0.16 
Adjustment  Factor    
WI Wage Index applicable to the area where the 0.99 0.16 
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hospital is located 
COLA Cost of living adjustment for operating PPS.  
All hospitals except Alaska and Hawaii use 
1.000 
1.00 0.02 
GAF Geographic adjustment factor for Capital 
PPS 
0.98 0.10 
OPCCR Ratio of Medicare operation costs to 
Medicare covered charge 
0.38 0.15 
CPCCR Ratio of Medicare capital costs to Medicare 
covered charge 
0.03 0.02 
RESBED Resident to bed ratio used to calculate the 
IME adjustment for operating PPS 
0.06 0.16 
RDAY Resident to average daily census ratio used 
to calculate the IME adjusted for capital PPS 
0.09 0.22 
TCHOP IME adjustment for operation PPS 0.03 0.07 
TCHCP IME adjustment for capital PPS 0.03 0.07 
DSHOPG Operating disproportionate share adjustment 0.11 0.12 
DSHCPG Capital disproportionate share adjustment 0.03 0.04 
Market 
Characteristicsb 
   
POPSQ  Population in thousands per square mile at 
the county level 
1.56 5.65 
NHOS Number of short-term general hospitals at 
the county level 
7.53 13.94 
HHI Herfindahl index at the county level 0.39 0.43 
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Notes: Data are from the PPS Impact File for FY 2007 unless otherwise noted 
      a: Data are from the “Hospital Compare” website. 
      b: Data are from the 2008 Area Resource File and reported at the county level 
(N=1526) 
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Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables for Heart Failure Care (N=3078) 
Variable  Description Mean  SD 
Payment a    
Pay Medicare average payment (measured 
in thousands) for heart failure DRG 127 
6.38 1.50 
Cases Number of cases for heart failure DRG 
127 
188.39 153.98 
Pay*Cases Total payment for heart failure DRG 127 1228.91 1106.52 
Hospital 
Characteristics 
   
Ownership    
OWNERG 1=Government; 0=others 0.19 0.39 
OWNERV 1=Voluntary non-profit; 0=others 0.64 0.48 
OWNERP 1=Profit; 0=others 0.17 0.38 
Region    
 New 
England 
1=NEW ENGLAND;0=others 0.04 0.21 
Middle 
Atlantic 
1=MIDDLE ATLANTIC; 0=others 0.12 0.33 
South Atlantic 1=SOUTH ATLANTIC; 0=others 0.18 0.39 
East North 
Central 
1=EAST NORTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.15 0.36 
East South 
Central 
1=EAST SOUTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.10 0.30 
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West North 
Central 
1=WEST NORTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.07 0.27 
West South 
Central 
1=WEST SOUTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.14 0.35 
Mountain 1=MOUNTAIN; 0=others 0.06 0.24 
Pacific 1=PACIFIC; 0=others 0.12 0.32 
BED    
Bed50                        1 if beds<= 50; 0=others 0.13 0.34 
Bed51_100 1 if 50<beds<=100; 0=others 0.20 0.40 
Bed101_150 1 if 100<beds<=150; 0=others 0.20 0.40 
Bed151_200 1 if 150<beds<=200; 0=others 0.12 0.33 
Bed201_300 1 if 200<beds<=300; 0=others 0.16 0.37 
Bed301 1 if beds>300; 0=others 0.19 0.39 
URBAN 1 if geographic location is at the Urban, 
0=rural 
0.71 0.45 
TEACH 1 if teaching hospital, 0=non-teaching 
hospital 
0.33 0.47 
CMI Case mixed index 1.36 0.26 
ADC Average daily census 122.02 128.92 
BILLS Medicare cases measured in thousands  3.69 3.24 
MCRPCT Medicare days as a percent of total 
inpatient days 
0.50 0.14 
DSHPCT Disproportionate share percent 0.27 0.17 
Adjustment  Factor    
WI Wage Index applicable to the area 0.99 0.16 
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where the hospital is located 
COLA Cost of living adjustment for operating 
PPS.  All hospitals except Alaska and 
Hawaii use 1.000 
1.00 0.02 
GAF Geographic adjustment factor for 
Capital PPS 
0.99 0.10 
OPCCR Ratio of Medicare operation costs to 
Medicare covered charge 
0.38 0.15 
CPCCR Ratio of Medicare capital costs to 
Medicare covered charge 
0.03 0.02 
RESBED Resident to bed ratio used to calculate 
the IME adjustment for operating PPS 
0.06 0.16 
RDAY Resident to average daily census ratio 
used to calculate the IME adjusted for 
capital PPS 
0.09 0.22 
TCHOP IME adjustment for operation PPS 0.03 0.07 
TCHCP IME adjustment for capital PPS 0.03 0.07 
DSHOPG Operating disproportionate share 
adjustment 
0.11 0.12 
DSHCPG Capital disproportionate share 
adjustment 
0.03 0.04 
Market 
Characteristicsb 
   
POPSQ  Population in thousands per square 
mile at the county level 
1.56 5.60 
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NHOS Number of short-term general hospitals 
at the county level 
7.90 14.76 
HHI Herfindahl index at the county level 0.39 0.43 
Notes: Data are from the PPS Impact File for FY 2007 unless otherwise noted 
      a: Data are from the “Hospital Compare” website. 
      b: Data are from the 2008 Area Resource File and reported at the county level 
(N=1526) 
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Table 6  
Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables for Heart Attack Care (N=1528) 
Variable  Description Mean  SD 
Payment a    
Pay Medicare payment index (measured in 
thousands) for heart attack (see text for 
definition) 
8.51 2.10 
Cases Number of cases for heart attack under 
DRG 121 and DRG 122 
87.80 52.46 
Pay*Cases Weighted Total payment for heart attack 
under DRG 121 and DRG 122 
764.76 534.78 
Hospital 
Characteristics 
   
Ownership    
OWNERG 1=Government; 0=others 0.14 0.32 
OWNERV 1=Voluntary non-profit; 0=others 0.72 0.45 
OWNERP 1=Profit; 0=others 0.14 0.35 
Region    
 New 
England 
1=NEW ENGLAND;0=others 0.06 0.23 
Middle 
Atlantic 
1=MIDDLE ATLANTIC; 0=others 0.17 0.37 
South Atlantic 1=SOUTH ATLANTIC; 0=others 0.23 0.42 
East North 
Central 
1=EAST NORTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.16 0.37 
59 
 
East South 
Central 
1=EAST SOUTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.08 0.27 
West North 
Central 
1=WEST NORTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.07 0.25 
West South 
Central 
1=WEST SOUTH CENTRAL; 0=others 0.10 0.30 
Mountain 1=MOUNTAIN; 0=others 0.04 0.19 
Pacific 1=PACIFIC; 0=others 0.10 0.30 
BED    
Bed50                        1 if beds<= 50; 0=others 0.01 0.12 
Bed51_100 1 if 50<beds<=100; 0=others 0.09 0.29 
Bed101_150 1 if 100<beds<=150; 0=others 0.18 0.38 
Bed151_200 1 if 150<beds<=200; 0=others 0.16 0.37 
Bed201_300 1 if 200<beds<=300; 0=others 0.24 0.42 
Bed301 1 if beds>300; 0=others 0.31 0.46 
URBAN 1 if geographic location is at the Urban, 
0=rural 
0.81 0.39 
TEACH 1 if teaching hospital, 0=non-teaching 
hospital 
0.44 0.50 
CMI Case mixed index 1.47 0.24 
ADC Average daily census 178.3 146.67 
BILLS Medicare cases measured  in thousands  5.47 3.56 
MCRPCT Medicare days as a percent of total 
inpatient days 
0.51 0.12 
DSHPCT Disproportionate share percent 0.25 0.15 
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Adjustment  Factor    
WI Wage Index applicable to the area where 
the hospital is located 
1.01 0.15 
COLA Cost of living adjustment for operating 
PPS.  All hospitals except Alaska and 
Hawaii use 1.000 
1.00 0.02 
                
GAF 
Geographic adjustment factor for Capital 
PPS 
1.00 0.10 
 OPCCR      Ratio of Medicare operation costs to 
Medicare covered charge 
0.36 0.14 
CPCCR Ratio of Medicare capital costs to 
Medicare covered charge 
0.03 0.01 
RESBED Resident to bed ratio used to calculate 
the IME adjustment for operating PPS 
0.08 0.17 
RDAY Resident to average daily census ratio 
used to calculate the IME adjusted for 
capital PPS 
0.11 0.23 
TCHOP IME adjustment for operation PPS 0.04 0.08 
TCHCP IME adjustment for capital PPS 0.03 0.07 
DSHOPG Operating disproportionate share 
adjustment 
0.10 0.11 
DSHCPG Capital disproportionate share adjustment 0.04 0.04 
Market 
Characteristicsb 
   
POPSQ  Population in thousands per square mile 1.92 6.42 
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at the county level 
NHOS Number of short-term general hospitals at 
the county level 
7.54 12.70 
HHI Herfindahl index at the county level 0.34 0.40 
Notes: Data are from the PPS Impact File for FY 2007 unless otherwise noted 
            a: Data are from the “Hospital Compare” website. 
            b: Data are from the 2008 Area Resource File and reported at the 
county level (N=1526) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Table 7 
Correlation of Process of Care Quality Measures for Pneumonia (N=3012) 
 PN1 PN2 PN3 PN4 PN5 PN6 PN7 
PN1 1.000       
PN2 0.243 1.000      
PN3 0.097 0.338 1.000     
PN4 0.213 0.503 0.173 1.000    
PN5 0.176 0.403 0.355 0.197 1.000   
PN6 0.282 0.326 0.184 0.251 0.309 1.000  
PN7 0.204 0.794 0.315 0.430 0.346 0.291 1.000 
Note: All pair-wise correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 
Estimated Linear Regression Models for the Overall Quality (PN) of Pneumonia Care  
                                        Hospital Quality 
 OLS Estimates FGLS Estimates 
 With Standard 
Errors 
With Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
With Standard 
Errors 
With Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pay -9.344 * 
(5.176) 
-9.344 * 
(5.011) 
-7.536 * 
(4.493) 
-7.536 * 
(4. 12) 
Pay * Cases 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
(Pay)2 0.638 ** 
(0.298) 
0.638 ** 
(0.287) 
0.501* 
(0.256) 
0.501** 
(0.237) 
Ownership          
Non-profit 
9.117*** 
(2.510) 
9.117*** 
(2.684) 
8.888*** 
(2.386) 
8.888*** 
(2.381) 
Profit 8.533*** 
(3.256) 
8.533** 
(3.584) 
8.735*** 
(3.164) 
8.735*** 
(3.117) 
REGION     
New England           30.039*** 
(5.602) 
30.039*** 
(5.100) 
28.350*** 
(4.136) 
28.350*** 
(4.506) 
Middle 
Atlantic 
22.192*** 
(4.652) 
22.192*** 
(4.742) 
22.676*** 
(3.900) 
22.676*** 
(4.375) 
South 13.144*** 13.144*** 17.401*** 17.401*** 
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Atlantic (4.676) (5.027) (4.186) (4.489) 
East North 
Central 
22.338*** 
(4.507) 
22.338*** 
(4.977) 
24.857*** 
(3.949) 
24.857*** 
(4.345) 
East South 
Central 
18.833*** 
(5.381) 
18.833*** 
(5.718) 
22.301*** 
(4.757) 
22.301*** 
(4.987) 
West North 
Central 
23.532*** 
(5.207) 
23.532*** 
(5.248) 
28.377*** 
(4.403) 
28.377*** 
(4.549) 
West South 
Central 
17.148*** 
(4.841) 
17.148*** 
(5.118) 
19.679*** 
(4.249) 
19.679*** 
(4.493) 
Mountain 4.832 
(5.072) 
4.832 
(4.965) 
8.339** 
(4.347) 
8.339* 
(4.463) 
BEDS     
BED51_100                   11.501*** 
(3.389) 
11.501*** 
(3.916) 
8.614** 
(3.851) 
8.614** 
(3.641) 
BED101_150 7.305* 
(4.217) 
7.305* 
(4.373) 
6.699 
(4.236) 
6.699* 
(4.070) 
BED151_200 5.936 
(4.977) 
5.936 
(5.071) 
5.991 
(4.697) 
5.991 
(4.510) 
BED201_300 0.936 
(5.459) 
0.936 
(5.524) 
0.209 
(5.054) 
0.209 
(4.924) 
BED301 3.170 
(6.689) 
3.170 
(6.417) 
0.146 
(5.850) 
0.146 
(5.712) 
URBAN -2.091 
(3.317) 
-2.091 
(3.521) 
-3.480 
(3.051) 
-3.480 
(2.883) 
TEACHING 1.687 1.687 0.293 0.293 
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(3.057) (3.024) (2.329) (2.585) 
CMI 20.332*** 
(5.794) 
20.332*** 
(6.206) 
19.314*** 
(4.714) 
19.314*** 
(5.477) 
ADC -0.038 
(0.024) 
-0.038 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.005 
(0.020) 
BILLS -0.805 
(0.989) 
-0.805 
(0.938) 
-0.907 
(0.764) 
-0.907 
(0.793) 
MCRPCT -33.458*** 
(11.236) 
-33.458*** 
(12.369) 
-23.933** 
(9.906) 
-23.933** 
(10.213) 
DSHPCT -99.398*** 
(17.279) 
-99.398*** 
(22.513) 
-78.328*** 
(19.573) 
-78.328*** 
(17.395) 
Adjustment Factors     
WI 41.981 
(37.774) 
41.981 
(32.675) 
78.073** 
(33.486) 
78.073*** 
(29.332) 
COLA -92.591** 
(47.163) 
-92.591** 
(48.846) 
-75.430*** 
(28.551) 
-75.430** 
(35.416) 
GAF -24.851 
(56.429) 
-24.851 
(48.064) 
-66.356 
(49.956) 
-66.356 
(44.209) 
OPCCR -40.579*** 
(8.388) 
-40.579*** 
(9.544) 
-28.875*** 
(7.676) 
-28.875*** 
(7.290) 
CPCCR 134.284** 
(70.225) 
134.284 
(82.535) 
117.656** 
(58.849) 
117.656** 
(60.459) 
RESBED 317.232 
(288.923) 
317.232 
(348.452) 
311.125 
(262.723) 
311.125 
(311.853) 
RDAY 356.535 356.535 498.211** 498.211 
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(251.997) (325.855) (245.587) (307.299) 
TCHOP -740.360 
(686.721) 
-740.360 
(814.584) 
-810.952 
(625.338) 
-810.952 
(738.419) 
TCHCP -1193.063 
(728.127) 
-1193.063 
(957.989) 
-1549.566** 
(709.016) 
-1549.566* 
(897.483) 
DSHOPG 87.724*** 
(31.654) 
87.724** 
(36.233) 
73.389** 
(31.190) 
73.389** 
(30.015) 
DSHCPG -81.818 
(68.011) 
-81.818 
(68.462) 
-57.220 
(58.437) 
-57.220 
(58.739) 
Market 
Characteristics 
    
POPPS -0.006 
(0.216) 
-0.006 
(0.282) 
-0.321 
(0.224) 
-0.321 
(0.272) 
NHOS -0.412*** 
(0.079) 
-0.412*** 
(0.110) 
-0.170* 
(0.098) 
-0.170* 
(0.092) 
HHI -0.767 
(2.951) 
-0.767 
(2.947) 
0.586 
(2.576) 
0.586 
(2.658) 
Constant 706.463 
(56.150) 
706.463 
(57.026) 
680.776 
(38.526) 
680.776 
(44.800) 
R-squared 0.191 0.191 0.147 0.147 
Notes: * Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.05<p<.10); **Indicates a 
statistically significant difference (0.01<p<.05); *** Indicates a statistically significant 
difference p<.01. 
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Table 9  
Marginal Effect of the Payment Rate on the Quality Index for Different Levels of Payment and Caseload of Pneumonia Care 
(Change in Quality with a $100 Change in the Medicare Payment Rate, i.e. Δpay=0.1) 
Payment 
(Percentile 
and Pay) 
Caseload (Percentile and Cases) 
1% 
Case=17 
5% 
Case=32 
10% 
Case=47 
25% 
Case=76 
50% 
Case=121 
75% 
Case186 
90% 
Case=271 
95% 
Case=329 
99% 
Cases=470 
1% 
Pay=4.752 
-0.287 
(0.216) 
-0.280 
(0.215) 
-0.272 
(0.215) 
-0.257 
(0.215) 
-0.235 
(0.215) 
-0.202 
(0.215) 
-0.159 
(0.217) 
-0.129 
(0.220) 
-0.058 
(0.227) 
5% 
Pay=5.023 
-0.261 
(0.206) 
-0.253 
(0.205) 
-0.246 
(0.205) 
-0.231 
(0.205) 
-0.208 
(0.205) 
-0.175 
(0.205) 
-0.132 
(0.208) 
-0.103 
(0.210) 
-0.032 
(0.218) 
10% 
Pay=5.170 
-0.247 
(0.200) 
-0.239 
(0.200) 
-0.232 
(0.200) 
-0.217 
(0.200) 
-0.194 
(0.200) 
-0.161 
(0.200) 
-0.118 
(0.202) 
-0.089 
(0.205) 
-0.018 
(0.213) 
25% 
Pay=5.443 
-0.221 
(0.191) 
-0.212 
(0.190) 
-0.205 
(0.190) 
-0.191 
(0.190) 
-0.168 
(0.190) 
-0.135 
(0.191) 
-0.092 
(0.193) 
-0.063 
(0.195) 
0.008 
(0.204) 
50% 
Pay=5.913 
-0.175 
(0.175) 
-0.168 
(0.175) 
-0.160 
(0.175) 
-0.145 
(0.174) 
-0.123 
(0.174) 
-0.090 
(0.175) 
-0.047 
(0.178) 
-0.017 
(0.180) 
0.054 
(0.190) 
75% -0.099 -0.091 -0.083 -0.069 -0.046 -0.013 0.030 0.059 0.131 
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Pay=6.709 (0.152) (0.152) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.155) (0.158) (0.169) 
90% 
Pay=8.014 
0.027 
(0.128) 
0.035 
(0.127) 
0.042 
(0.127) 
0.057 
(0.127) 
0.080 
(0.127) 
0.113 
(0.129) 
0.156 
(0.133) 
0.185 
(0.136) 
0.256* 
(0.149) 
95% 
Pay=8.961 
0.119 
(0.126) 
0.126 
(0.126) 
0.134 
(0.125) 
0.148 
(0.125) 
0.171 
(0.126) 
0.208* 
(0.126) 
0.247* 
(0.131) 
0.276* 
(0.135) 
0.348** 
(0.149) 
99% 
Pay=11.520 
0.365* 
(0.182) 
0.373** 
(0.182) 
0.380** 
(0.182) 
0.395** 
(0.182) 
0.418** 
(0.183) 
0.451** 
(0.184) 
0.494*** 
(0.187) 
0.523*** 
(0.190) 
0.594*** 
(0.201) 
Notes:  In these calculations, caseload ranges from its lowest to highest value; and payment ranges from its lowest to highest 
value. 
            These results are calculated on model (4): FGLS estimates with robust standard errors. 
Statistically significant marginal effects are highlighted in bold. 
            * Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.05<p<.10); **Indicates a statistically significant difference 
(0.01<p<.05); *** Indicates a statistically significant difference (p<.01). 
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Table 10  
Marginal Effect of a $100 change on the Medicare Payment Rate on PN, and PN1 
through PN7, Calculated at the Sample Mean for Pneumonia care (Pay=6.3 and 
Cases=145) 
Variable Description Based on 
OLS Estimates 
Based on FGLS 
Estimates  
  With Robust 
Standard Errors 
With Robust 
Standard Errors 
  Model(2) Model(4) 
PN Overall quality index for pneumonia 
care (see text for definition) 
-0.725 -0.498 
PN1 % of pneumonia patients who were 
given oxygenation assessment 
0.073 0.027 
PN2 % of pneumonia patients who were 
assessed and given pneumococcal 
vaccination 
-0.076 -0.323 
PN3 % of pneumonia patients whose initial 
emergency room blood culture was 
performed prior to the administration of 
their first hospital dose of antibiotics 
0.449 0.224 
PN4 % of pneumonia patients who were 
given smoking cessation advice 
/counseling 
0.142 0.527 
PN5 % of pneumonia patients who were 0.042 -0.061 
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given initial antibiotic(s) within 4 hours 
after arrival 
PN6 % of pneumonia patients who were 
given the most appropriate initial 
antibiotic(s) 
-0.653 -0.573 
PN7 % of pneumonia patients who were 
assessed and given influenza 
vaccination 
-0.788 -0.631 
Notes: None of these marginal effects of the payment rate are statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level or better. 
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Table 11  
Correlation of Process of Care Quality Measures for Heart Failure (N=3078) 
 HF1 HF2 HF3 HF4 
HF1 1.000    
HF2 0.476 1.000   
HF3 0.403 0.433 1.000  
HF4 0.545 0.477 0.287 1.000 
Note: All pair-wise correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 12 
Estimated Linear Regression Models for the Overall Quality (HF) of Heart Failure Care  
                                                    Hospital Quality 
 OLS Estimates FGLS Estimates 
 With 
Standard 
Errors 
With Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
With 
Standard 
Errors 
With Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pay -0.336 
(0.263) 
-0.336* 
(0.201) 
-0.997* 
(0.59) 
-0.997** 
(0.46) 
Pay * Cases 0.002**           
(0.001) 
0.002**          
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
(Pay)2 0.046*  
(0.027) 
0.046*  
(0.024) 
0.062 
(0.041) 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
Ownership          
Non-profit 
5.353** 
(2.556) 
5.353** 
(2.335) 
4.623** 
(1.810) 
4.623** 
(1.829) 
Profit 2.741 
(3.256) 
2.741 
(2.941) 
5.215** 
(2.421) 
5.215** 
(2.358) 
REGION     
          New 
England 
16.052*** 
(4.773) 
16.052*** 
(4.390) 
8.848*** 
(3.442) 
8.848** 
(3.844) 
Middle Atlantic 12.394*** 
(3.972) 
12.394*** 
(3.912) 
11.245*** 
(2.911) 
11.245*** 
(3.219) 
South Atlantic 16.916*** 
(3.934) 
16.916*** 
(3.949) 
12.590*** 
(3.020) 
12.590*** 
(3.272) 
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East North 
Central 
19.861*** 
(3.839) 
19.861*** 
(3.792) 
17.356*** 
(2.919) 
17.356*** 
(3.203) 
East South 
Central 
13.470*** 
(4.533) 
13.470*** 
(4.615) 
9.502*** 
(3.551) 
9.502** 
(3.800) 
West North 
Central 
12.955*** 
(4.391) 
12.955*** 
(4.469) 
15.193*** 
(3.377) 
15.193*** 
(3.384) 
West South 
Central 
14.070*** 
(4.098) 
14.070*** 
(4.167) 
12.843*** 
(3.167) 
12.843*** 
(3.302) 
Mountain -4.217          
(4.291) 
-4.217          
(4.358) 
1.342 
(3.585) 
1.342 
(3.417) 
BEDS     
BED51_100                   26.474*** 
(2.793) 
26.474*** 
(3.752) 
25.419*** 
(3.687) 
25.419*** 
(3.772) 
BED101_150 31.376*** 
(3.356) 
31.376*** 
(3.968) 
29.777*** 
(3.933) 
29.777*** 
(3.979) 
BED151_200 31.850*** 
(3.889) 
31.850*** 
(4.159) 
32.167***  
(4.011) 
32.167***  
(4.059) 
BED201_300 33.654*** 
(4.152) 
33.654*** 
(4.366) 
32.088***  
(4.151) 
32.088***  
(4.203) 
BED301 32.902*** 
(5.197) 
32.902*** 
(4.844) 
31.562***  
(4.575) 
31.562***  
(4.489) 
URBAN 2.170  
(2.787) 
2.170  
(3.297) 
2.610  
(2.658) 
2.610  
(2.728) 
TEACHING 0.376  
(2.595) 
0.376  
(2.177) 
-0.015  
(1.850) 
-0.015  
(1.931) 
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CMI 34.594*** 
(4.477) 
34.594*** 
(4.278) 
22.407*** 
(2.991) 
22.407*** 
(3.058) 
ADC -0.037*      
(0.020) 
-0.037**      
(0.014) 
-.001 
(0.013) 
-.001  
(0.012) 
BILLS 0.253 
(0.858) 
0.253 
(0.703) 
0.304 
(0.561) 
0.304 
(0.543) 
MCRPCT -35.480*** 
(9.414) 
-35.480*** 
(10.271) 
-22.243*** 
(7.757) 
-22.243*** 
(8.185) 
DSHPCT -69.150*** 
(14.112) 
-69.150*** 
(21.220) 
-53.657*** 
(16.498) 
-53.657*** 
(16.315) 
Adjustment  Factors     
WI 20.265  
(32.209) 
20.265  
(41.467) 
65.367** 
(28.711) 
65.367** 
(26.610) 
COLA 1.753 
(41.885) 
1.753 
(46.311) 
-43.275 
(46.053) 
-43.275 
(33.127) 
GAF 19.234  
(48.233) 
19.234  
(61.838) 
-53.539  
(43.119) 
-53.539  
(40.145) 
OPCCR -27.666*** 
(7.083) 
-27.666*** 
(7.614) 
-17.690*** 
(5.836) 
-17.690*** 
(5.876) 
CPCCR 14.163 
(60.697) 
14.163 
(77.270) 
28.360 
(47.786) 
28.360 
(50.353) 
RESBED 353.815  
(244.574) 
353.815*  
(187.719) 
242.416 
(180.152) 
242.416 
(183.059) 
RDAY 302.116  
(212.857) 
302.116*  
(171.559) 
208.999 
(177.323) 
208.999 
(180.271) 
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TCHOP -722.563 
(580.713) 
-722.563* 
(443.435) 
-491.542 
(429.763) 
-491.542 
(437.911) 
TCHCP -989.580 
(615.620) 
-989.580** 
(500.267) 
-690.678 
(518.832) 
-690.678 
(523.641) 
DSHOPG 94.481*** 
(26.353) 
94.481*** 
(34.078) 
71.909*** 
(25.262) 
71.909*** 
(26.309) 
DSHCPG -67.639  
(57.397) 
-67.639  
(59.681) 
-27.830  
(48.160) 
-27.830  
(51.274) 
Market 
Characteristics 
    
POPPS -0.181 
(0.174) 
-0.181 
(0.218) 
-0.587*** 
(0.144) 
-0.587*** 
(0.193) 
NHOS -0.192*** 
(0.063) 
-0.192*** 
(0.066) 
-0.100* 
(0.053) 
-0.100** 
(0.049) 
HHI -1.373  
(2.480) 
-1.373  
(2.664) 
-1.181 
(2.094) 
-1.181 
(2.124) 
Constant 271.095  
(47.984) 
271.095  
(53.969) 
336.444 
(50.009) 
336.444 
(38.228) 
R-squared 0.223 0.223 0.150 0.150 
Notes: * Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.05<p<.10); **Indicates 
a statistically significant difference (0.01<p<.05); *** Indicates a statistically significant 
difference p<.01. 
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Table 13 
Marginal Effect of the Payment Rate on the Quality Index for Different Levels of Payment and Caseload of Heart Failure Care 
(Change in Quality with a $100 Change in the Medicare Payment Rate, i.e. Δpay=0.1) 
Payment 
(Percentile and 
Pay) 
Caseload (Percentile and Cases) 
1% 
Case=17 
5% 
Case=34 
10% 
Case=47 
25% 
Case=79 
50% 
Case=147 
75% 
Case=250 
90% 
Case=380 
95% 
Case=499 
99% 
Case=709 
1% 
Pay=4.750 
-0.130 
(0.130) 
-0.129 
(0.129) 
-0.120 
(0.129) 
-0.115 
(0.127) 
-0.102 
(0.125) 
-0.086 
(0.126) 
-0.072  
(0.126) 
-0.064  
(0.127) 
-0.027   
(0.132) 
5% 
Pay=5.032 
-0.112 
(0.122) 
-0.111 
(0.121) 
-0.111 
(0.121) 
-0.110 
(0.120) 
-0.099 
(0.120) 
-0.074 
(0.125) 
-0.068  
(0.128) 
-0.057 
(0.129) 
-0.018 
(0.130) 
10% 
Pay=5.182 
-0.098 
(0.118) 
-0.095 
(0.118) 
-0.091 
(0.117) 
-0.082 
(0.117) 
-0.066 
(0.117) 
-0.060 
(0.120) 
-0.048 
(0.120) 
-0.039 
(0.122) 
0.012   
(0.125) 
25% 
Pay=5.449 
-0.083 
(0.110) 
-0.076 
(0.109) 
-0.063 
(0.109) 
-0.049 
(0.109) 
-0.037 
(0.109) 
-0.022 
(0.111) 
-0.017 
(0.113) 
-0.008   
(0.115) 
0.046   
(0.119) 
50% 
Pay=5.929 
-0.051 
(0.102) 
-0.046 
(0.102) 
-0.035 
(0.102) 
-0.024 
(0.101) 
-0.012 
(0.101) 
-0.007 
(0.101) 
-0.001  
(0.104) 
0.001   
(0.105) 
0.060   
(0.108) 
75% -0.022 -0.013 -0.008 0.003 0.010 0.037 0.045   0.056   0.093   
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Pay=6.791 (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.071) (0.075) (0.083) 
90% 
Pay=8.266 
0.043 
(0.125) 
0.061 
(0.124) 
0.073 
(0.124) 
0.092 
(0.124) 
0.118 
(0.124) 
0.149 
(0.124) 
0.173 
(0.130) 
0.238* 
(0.139) 
0.328** 
(0.145) 
95% 
Pay=9.254 
0.222 
(0.156) 
0.236 
(0.156) 
0.240 
(0.156) 
0.262* 
(0.155) 
0.286* 
(0.155) 
0.357** 
(0.156) 
0.364** 
(0.160) 
0.397** 
(0.166) 
0.493*** 
(0.183) 
99% 
Pay=11.579 
0.648** 
(0.275) 
0.679** 
(0.275) 
0.712** 
(0.277) 
0.745*** 
(0.280) 
0.803*** 
(0.282) 
0.845*** 
(0.286) 
0.897*** 
(0.291) 
0.945*** 
(0.301) 
1.134*** 
(0.341) 
Notes:In these calculations, caseload ranges from its lowest to highest value; and payment ranges from its lowest to highest 
value. 
      These results are calculated on model (4): FGLS estimates with robust standard errors. 
Statistically significant marginal effects are highlighted in bold. 
      * Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.05<p<.10); **Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.01<p<.05); *** 
Indicates a statistically significant difference (p<.01). 
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Table 14  
Marginal Effect of a $100 Change in the Medicare Payment Rate on HF, and HF1 
through HF4, Calculated at the Sample Mean for Heart Failure Care(Pay=6.38 and 
Cases=188) 
Varia
ble 
Description Based on                    
OLS Estimates 
Based on      
FGLS Estimates  
  With Robust 
Standard Errors 
With Robust 
Standard Errors 
  Model(2) Model(4) 
HF Overall quality index for heart failure 
care (see text for definition) 
0.025 0.017 
HF1 % of heart failure patients who were 
given discharge instructions 
0.045 0.068 
HF2 % of heart failure patients who were 
given an evaluation of left ventricular 
systolic function 
0.124 -0.013 
HF3 % of heart failure patients who were 
given ACE inhibitor or ARB for left 
ventricular systolic dysfunction  
0.489 0.056 
HF4 % of heart failure patients who were 
given smoking cessation advice 
/counseling 
-0.015 -0.071* 
Notes * Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.05<p<.10). 
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Table 15 
Correlation of Process of Care Quality Measures for Heart Attack (N=1528) 
 AMI1 AMI2 AMI3 AMI4 AMI5 AMI6 
AMI1 1.000      
AMI2 0.532 1.000     
AMI3 0.348 0.391 1.000    
AMI4 0.219 0.209 0.125 1.000   
AMI5 0.480 0.679 0.471 0.231 1.000  
AMI6 0.602 0.465 0.383 0.174 0.637 1.000 
Note: All pair-wise correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 16 
Estimated Linear Regression Models for the Overall Quality of Heart Attack Care  
                                                    Hospital Quality 
 OLS Estimates FGLS Estimates 
 With 
Standard 
Errors 
With Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
With 
Standard 
Errors 
With Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pay -0.028  
(1.778) 
-0.028  
(1.774) 
-0.345 
(1.144) 
-0.345 
(1.090) 
Pay * Cases -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
(Pay)2 0.016 
(0.059) 
0.016 
(0.045) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
0.026 
(0.024) 
Ownership          
Non-profit 
2.190
(2.281) 
2.190 
(2.170) 
1.840 
(1.492) 
1.840 
(1.582) 
Profit -0.120 
(2.969) 
-0.120 
(2.296) 
-0.268 
(2.258) 
-0.268 
(2.315) 
REGION     
          New 
England 
10.702** 
(4.495) 
10.702** 
(4.478) 
3.676 
(3.047) 
3.676 
(3.032) 
Middle Atlantic 3.111 
(3.812) 
3.111 
(4.497) 
3.227 
(2.484) 
3.227 
(2.830) 
South Atlantic 3.915 
(3.773) 
3.915 
(3.976) 
1.874 
(2.551) 
1.874 
(2.758) 
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East North 
Central 
7.245* 
(3.783) 
7.245* 
(3.800) 
4.563* 
(2.444) 
4.563* 
(2.612) 
East South 
Central 
1.414 
(4.547) 
1.414 
(4.667) 
1.352 
(2.858) 
1.352 
(3.062) 
West North 
Central 
11.830*** 
(4.423) 
11.830*** 
(3.376) 
9.065*** 
(2.689) 
9.065*** 
(2.811) 
West South 
Central 
3.996 
(4.121) 
3.996 
(4.240) 
0.501 
(2.866) 
0.501 
(2.997) 
Mountain 4.723 
(4.834) 
4.723 
(4.546) 
2.656 
(3.010) 
2.656 
(3.026) 
BEDS     
BED51_100                   6.414
(6.630) 
6.414 
(12.519) 
3.591 
(9.173) 
3.591 
(8.009) 
BED101_150 13.465** 
(6.583) 
13.465 
(12.360) 
9.617 
(9.012) 
9.617 
(7.890) 
BED151_200 16.962** 
(6.694) 
16.962 
(12.190) 
11.065 
(8.987) 
11.065 
(7.858) 
BED201_300 15.337** 
(6.884) 
15.337** 
(12.203) 
11.042 
(9.040) 
11.042 
(7.901) 
BED301 14.940** 
(7.423) 
14.940 
(12.373) 
11.307 
(9.210) 
11.307 
(8.027) 
URBAN -2.250 
(3.577) 
-2.250 
(4.500) 
-1.138 
(3.361) 
-1.138 
(2.922) 
TEACHING 0.726 
(2.276) 
0.726 
(2.195) 
-0.545 
(1.485) 
-0.545 
(1.452) 
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CMI 15.7395*** 
(4.861) 
15.7395*** 
(4.504) 
10.158*** 
(2.978) 
10.158*** 
(2.921) 
ADC -0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.026** 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
BILLS -0.653 
(0.730) 
-0.653 
(0.557) 
-0.329 
(0.428) 
-0.329 
(0.382) 
MCRPCT -30.709*** 
(11.409) 
-30.709*** 
(12.033) 
-21.090*** 
(8.194) 
-21.090*** 
(7.843) 
DSHPCT -56.026** 
(22.455) 
-56.026* 
(30.720) 
-32.649 
(23.943) 
-32.649 
(20.867) 
Adjustment  Factors     
WI 30.788 
(27.979) 
30.788 
(27.161) 
29.429 
(18.417) 
29.429 
(25.258) 
COLA -1.291 
(39.602) 
-1.291 
(37.018) 
1.590 
(19.604) 
1.590 
(19.735) 
GAF -5.942 
(41.799) 
-5.942 
(40.748) 
-14.046 
(27.485) 
-14.046 
(37.981) 
OPCCR -5.608 
(7.429) 
-5.608 
(7.707) 
-4.776 
(5.669) 
-4.776 
(5.084) 
CPCCR -22.896 
(68.112) 
-22.896 
(74.141) 
-0.773 
(56.688) 
-0.773 
(51.012) 
RESBED 300.252 
(247.726) 
300.252* 
(167.630) 
196.463 
(134.138) 
196.463 
(140.577) 
RDAY 266.599 
(239.682) 
 266.599 
(168.304) 
159.595 
(136.262) 
159.595 
(149.957) 
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TCHOP -698.295 
(602.879) 
-698.295* 
(413.890) 
-470.260 
(332.234) 
-470.260 
(347.548) 
TCHCP -775.009 
(679.854) 
-775.009 
(474.578) 
-436.895 
(384.043) 
-436.895 
(425.870) 
DSHOPG 38.347 
(32.694) 
38.347 
(41.541) 
8.124 
(30.199) 
8.124 
(27.350) 
DSHCPG 29.883 
(64.442) 
29.883 
(80.075) 
48.704 
(61.518) 
48.704 
(56.927) 
Market 
Characteristics 
    
POPPS -0.285* 
(0.151) 
-0.285* 
(0.165) 
-0.312** 
(0.150) 
-0.312** 
(0.137) 
NHOS -0.118* 
(0.069) 
-0.118* 
(0.077) 
-0.002 
(0.052) 
-0.002 
(0.052) 
HHI -0.332 
(2.571) 
-0.332 
(2.726) 
1.404 
(1.991) 
1.404 
(1.846) 
Constant 581.565 
(46.320) 
581.565 
(48.706) 
534.882 
(26.490) 
534.882 
(28.833) 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
Notes: * Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.05<p<.10); **Indicates a 
statistically significant difference (0.01<p<.05); *** Indicates a statistically significant 
difference p<.01. 
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Table 17 – Heart Attack 
Marginal Effect of the Payment Rate on the Quality Index for Different Levels of Payment and Caseload of Heart Attack Care 
(Change in Quality with a $100 Change in the Medicare Payment Rate, i.e. Δpay=0.1) 
Payment 
(Percentile 
and Pay) 
Caseload (Percentile and Cases) 
1% 
Cases=27 
5% 
Case=34 
10% 
Case=40 
25% 
Case=53 
50% 
Case=73 
75% 
Case=108 
90% 
Case=150 
95% 
Case=189 
99% 
Case=290 
1% 
Pay=5.372 
0.028  
(0.888) 
0.171 
(0.844) 
0.223 
(0.836) 
0.285 
(0.829) 
0.335 
(0.829) 
0.363 
(0.831) 
0.382 
(0.832) 
0.390 
(0.833) 
0.400 
(0.834) 
5% 
Pay=6.110 
0.033 
(0.856) 
0.176 
(0.810) 
0.228 
(0.801) 
0.290 
(0.795) 
0.340 
(0.794) 
0.368 
(0.795) 
0.387 
(0.797) 
0.395 
(0.798) 
0.405 
(0.799) 
10% 
Pay=6.521 
0.035  
(0.839) 
0.178 
(0.792) 
0.231 
(0.782) 
0.293 
(0.775) 
0.342 
(0.775) 
0.371 
(0.776) 
0.389 
(0.777) 
0.397 
(0.778) 
0.410 
(0.779) 
25% 
Pay=7.227 
0.040 
(0.809) 
0.183  
(0.760) 
0.235 
(0.749) 
0.298 
(0.742) 
0.347 
(0.741) 
0.376 
(0.742) 
0.394 
(0.743) 
0.403 
(0.744) 
0.412 
(0.745) 
50% 
Pay=8.068 
0.050 
(0.775) 
0.189  
(0.722) 
0.241  
(0.710) 
0.303 
(0.702) 
0.353 
(0.701) 
0.381 
(0.702) 
0.400 
(0.703) 
0.408 
(0.704) 
0.418 
(0.705) 
75% 0.054  0.197  0.249  0.312 0.361 0.389 0.408 0.416 0.426 
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Pay=9.259 (0.727) (0.669) (0.656) (0.647) (0.644) (0.645) (0.646) (0.647) (0.648) 
90% 
Pay=11.116 
0.066 
(0.656) 
0.209 
(0.589) 
0.262 
(0.573) 
0.324 
(0.561) 
0.374 
(0.557) 
0.402 
(0.557) 
0.420 
(0.559) 
0.429 
(0.559) 
0.439 
(0.560) 
95% 
Pay=12.610 
0.076 
(0.603) 
0.219 
(0.526) 
0.271 
(0.507) 
0.334 
(0.493) 
0.384 
(0.488) 
0.412 
(0.488) 
0.430 
(0.489) 
0.439 
(0.489) 
0.449 
(0.490) 
99% 
Pay=15.652 
0.097 
(0.510) 
0.240 
(0.410) 
0.292 
(0.384) 
0.355 
(0.361) 
0.404 
(0.352) 
0.433 
(0.350) 
0.451 
(0.350) 
0.459 
(0.351) 
0.469 
(0.352) 
Notes: In these calculations, caseload ranges from its lowest to highest value; and payment ranges from its lowest to highest 
value. 
       These results are calculated on model (4): FGLS estimates with robust standard errors. 
Statistically significant marginal effects are highlighted in bold. 
       * Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.05<p<.10); **Indicates a statistically significant difference (0.01<p<.05); *** 
Indicates a statistically significant difference (p<.01). 
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Table 18  
Marginal Effect of a $100 Change in the Medicare Payment Rate on AMI, and AMI1 
through AMI6, Calculated at the Sample Mean for Heart Attack Care (Pay=8.51 and 
Cases=87.80) 
Variable Description Based on                     
OLS Estimates 
Based on     
FGLS Estimates  
  With Robust 
Standard Errors 
With Robust 
Standard Errors 
  Model(2) Model(4) 
AMI Overall quality index for heart attack 
care (see text for definition) 
0.039 0.045 
AMI1 % of heart attack patients who were 
given aspirin at arrival 
0.663 0.501 
AMI2 % of heart attack patients who were 
given aspirin at discharge 
0.703 0.816 
AMI3 % of heart attack patients who were 
given ACE inhibitor or ARB for left 
ventricular systolic dysfunction  
0.315 0.476 
AMI4 % of heart attack patients who were 
given smoking cessation advice 
/counseling 
0.078 0.492 
AMI5 % of heart attack patients who were 
given beta blocker at discharge 
0.181 0.933 
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AMI6 % of heart attack patients who were 
given beta blocker at arrival 
0.738 0.112 
Notes: None of these marginal effects of the payment rate are statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
HOSPITAL QUALITY AND MEDICARE PAYMENT: 
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
 
by 
 
JINGHUA HUANG 
 
May 2011 
 
Advisor: Gail Summers 
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Does Medicare’s payment rate for a hospital stay influence the 
quality of care received by a patient?    This question is examined, 
theoretically and empirically.  First, a model is developed which 
generates the key hypothesis -- that Medicare’s payment rate per 
admission should be positively related to care quality.  This hypothesis is 
tested by estimating the relationship between Medicare’s DRG payment 
for pneumonia, heart failure and heart attacks and care quality, using 
clinically-recognized measures of the quality of pneumonia care, heart 
failure care and heart attack care.  Newly available data on acute 
hospitals in 2007 from “Hospital Compare” (maintained by CMS) are 
analyzed.  Similar results are provided from pneumonia care and heart 
failure care.  It is found that a significant positive relationship between 
Medicare’s payment rate and care quality for some hospitals in both 
pneumonia care and heart failure care, but not for others, and where it is 
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significant, the effect on quality is small in magnitude in both cares.  For a 
hospital with average characteristics, the effect of payment on quality is 
insignificant.  However, for hospitals that are very highly paid for 
pneumonia or heart failure and hospitals that treat large numbers of 
pneumonia cases or heart failure cases, a positive significant relationship 
is found.  For such hospitals, which likely derive substantial revenue from 
pneumonia care or heart failure care, an increase in Medicare’s payment 
rate leads to a very small improvement in the quality of care provided. 
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